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RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES OF
STUDENTS' BELONGINGS: A LEGAL,
EMPIRICAL, AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
JASON P. NANCE*
This Article provides a legal, empirical, and normative
analysis of an intrusive search practice used by public school
officials to prevent school crime: random, suspicionless
searches of students' belongings. First, it argues that these
searches are not permitted under the Fourth Amendment
unless schools have particularized evidence of a substance
abuse or weapons problem. Second, it provides a normative
evaluation of strict security measures in schools, especially
when they are applied disproportionately to minority
students. Third, drawing on recent restricted data from the
U.S. Department of Education's School Survey on Crime
and Safety, this Article provides empirical findings that
raise concerns that some public schools may be conducting
unconstitutional searches of students' belongings. In
addition, it shows that these potentially unconstitutional
searches are more likely to take place in schools with higher
minority populations than in schools with lower minority
populations, even after taking into account school officials'
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perceptions of the levels of crime where students hue and
where the school is located. Finally, this Article argues that
the Supreme Court should resolve any ambiguity in its
jurisprudence by expressly requiring school officials to have
particularized, objective evidence of a substance abuse or
weapons problem before permitting schools to perform these
intrusive searches.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that our public schools should be free
from violence, crime, and drugs. ' While school crime has
declined in recent years,^ recent statistics demonstrate that
violence and substance abuse continue to trouble public
schools. During the 2009-2010 school year, thirty-three
students, staff, and others died in a school-associated violent
event.3 In 2009, 8 percent of students in grades nine through
twelve reported being threatened or injured with a weapon on
school property at least one time.^ Also in 2009, 23 percent of
students in grades nine through twelve said that drugs were
offered, sold, or given to them.^
Naturally, school officials are concerned about violence and
substance abuse in their schools and have implemented various
measures to address these problems. For example, some
schools support worthwhile efforts such as implementing
curricula and instruction programs aimed at preventing
violence, providing mentors to students, and creating other
programs that promote a sense of community and social
integration among students.^ Other schools, however, perform
1. See, e.g., SIMON ROBERTS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2011, at iii (2012) [hereinafter INDICATORS OF
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002
.pdf.
2. See id. at 10 (stating that from 2009 to 2010, "the violent victimization
rate for students ages 12-18 at school declined from 20 per 1,000 students to 14
per 1,000 students"); id. at 60 (stating that between 1993 and 2009, "the
percentage [of students who reported] carrjang a weapon on school property
declined from 12 percent to 6 percent"); id. at v ("The percentage of students in
grades 9-12 who reported that drugs were offered, sold, or given to them
decreased from 32 percent in 1995 to 23 percent in 2009."). There is no clear
consensus on the reasons for the decline. See LISA SNELL, SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: BEST PRACTICES TO KEEP KIDS SAFE 2 (Jan. 2005),
http://reason.org/files/70all52cc03e81af5e7e3f2f073fdce3.pdf (explaining that it is
difficult to measure the effectiveness of many anti-violence programs because they
have been imperfectly monitored or evaluated and because school violence is
influenced by so many variables).
3. See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY, supra note l, at iii.
4. Id. at iv.
5. Id. at V.
6. See, e.g., SAMANTHA NEIMAN & MONICA R. HILL, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC, CRIME, VIOLENCE, DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN U.S.
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random, suspicionless searches on students to prevent students
from bringing drugs and weapons on campus.^ These searches
include random drug testing, dog sniffs, metal detector checks,
and searches through students' belongings.^ Recent data from
the U.S. Department of Education show that the use of these
strict security measures in public schools is not uncommon.^
The use of these search tactics raises important questions
regarding students' civil rights under the Fourth Amendment.
While several articles discuss students' Fourth Amendment
rights in school settings,*^ this Article provides a legal,
empirical, and normative analysis of a particularly intrusive
type of search practice: random, suspicionless searches of
students' belongings. This Article first argues that, consistent
with Supreme Court precedent and a recent Eighth Circuit
decision, random, suspicionless searches of students'
belongings are not permitted under the Fourth Amendment
unless certain conditions are present." Specifically, in order to
justify performing suspicionless, intrusive searches on the
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011320.pdf (reporting
the percentages of pubhc schools that use various violence prevention programs).
7. INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY, supra note 1, at 83 (showing
the percentages of schools that employ certain search methods).
8. Id.
9. See infra Table 1.
10. See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 104-05
(1996) (praising the Supreme Court's decision permitting suspicionless drug
testing in schools); Barry C. Feld, T.L.O and Redding's Unanswered
(Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80
MISS. L.J. 847, 851 (2011) (criticizing the Supreme Court for departing from
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in the school context); Martin R.
Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized
Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in Public Schools, 22 GA.
L. REV. 897, 898 (1988) (urging courts to require a finding of individualized
suspicion before permitting school officials to search students); Wayne R. LaFave,
Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a Patron Saint,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2588 (1996) (identifying numerous harms from the
Supreme Court's decision to permit suspicionless drug testing); Betsy Levin,
Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1669-72 (1986) (arguing that
relaxing traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in the school setting illustrates
"the dilemma involved in trying to convey constitutional values to our youth
through an institution which itself places less value on the particulars of some of
these constitutional values"); Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative
Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 298-301 (2011) (discussing students' reduced
expectation of privacy in school settings); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and
Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1424-26 (2000) (defending the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment analysis in schools on the grounds of necessity).
11. See infra Section I.
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general student population,'2 the Fourth Amendment requires
that a school official have particularized evidence
demonstrating that the school has a substance abuse or
weapons problem, unless the school official reasonably believes
that students are in immediate danger.'^ Conversely, if the
school official offers nothing more than "generalized concerns
about the existence of weapons and drugs in [her] school[]," she
is not entitled to conduct such searches. '^
Second, this Article argues that the above standard is not
only legally sound, but it is also more consistent with good
educational policy and practice because it limits the authority
of school officials to conduct random, suspicionless, intrusive
searches absent extenuating circumstances. ^^  Research
demonstrates that strict security measures deteriorate the
learning climate by engendering alienation, mistrust, and
resistance among students, instead of building a positive
climate based on mutual respect, support, community, and
collective responsibility.'^ In fact, empirical studies cast doubt
on whether strict security measures effectively reduce school
crime, 1^  and many researchers argue that implementing such
12. See, e.g.. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985) ("A search of a
child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of
subjective expectations of privacy.").
13. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 355-56 (8th Cir.
2004); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995); B.C. v.
Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266-68 (9th Cir. 1999); see also infra
Section I.E.
14. LiiiZeÄoc/z, 380 F. 3d at 356.
15. See ¿?i/ra Section II.
16. AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE
OF FEAR 7, 15-18 (2010) (explaining that student misbehavior is likely to increase
rather than decrease when students perceive they are treated unfairly and with
disrespect); see Randall R. Beger, The "Worst of Both Worlds:" School Security and
the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336,
340 (2003) (citing several studies demonstrating that "aggressive security
measures produce alienation and mistrust among students"); Michael
Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, 32 PSYCHOL. TODAY 52, 56 (1999) (providing
evidence that strict security measures alienate students); Pedro Noguera,
Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to School
Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190-91 (1995) (arguing that a "get tough"
approach does not create a safe environment because coercive measures create
mistrust and resistance among the student body).
17. See THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 8 (2005) (explaining that while strict
security measures "produce a perception of safety, there is little or no evidence
that they create safer learning environments or change disruptive behaviors"),
http://www.advancementproject.Org/page/-/resources/FINALEOLrep.pdf; John
Blosnich & Robert Bossarte, Low-Level Violence in Schools: Is There an
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measures increases misbehavior and crime.'^ Rather than
relying on coercive measures, research demonstrates that there
are alternative, more effective methods for reducing school
crime that maintain students' dignity, do not degrade the
learning environment, and teach students to value their
constitutional rights. '^
Third, this Article presents an empirical analysis that
seeks to identify how many schools use this intrusive search
practice and the conditions under which they do so.^ o The data
for this analysis came from two restricted-use datasets from
the School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS), primary
sources of public school data that the U.S. Department of
Education made available in 2010 and 2011 to qualifying
researchers.21 Each of the SSOCS databases is a collection of
Association Between School Safety Measures and Peer Victimization? 81 J. SCH.
HEALTH 1O7, 1O7 (2O11) (concluding that school security measures did not reduce
violent behaviors related to bullying); Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas
Simon, Impacts of Metal Detector ,Use in Schools: Insights from 15 Years of
Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 (2011) (concluding that there is insufficient
evidence to demonstrate whether metal detectors reduce school violence),
http://www.edweek.org/media/hankin-02security.pdf; Richard E. Redding & Sarah
M. Shalf, The Legal Context of School Violence: The Effectiveness of Federal, State,
and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence in Schools, 23 LAW &
POL'Y 297, 319-20 (2001) ("It is hard to find anything better than anecdotal
evidence" to demonstrate that strict security measures such as metal detectors
and guards reduce violence in schools.).
18. See Beger, supra note 16, at 340; Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 56;
Clifford H. Edwards, Student Violence and the Moral Dimensions of Education, 38
PSYCHOL. SCH. 249, 250 (2001) ("[I]ntrusive strategies are likely to undermine the
trust needed to build cooperative school communities capable of really preventing
violence."); Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School
Violence and Disruption: Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. &
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 333, 350, 352 (1999) (finding that student disorder and
victimization were higher in schools using strict security measures than in schools
that did not use such measures); KUPCHIK, supra note 16, at 15-18 (explaining
that student misbehavior is likely to increase rather than decrease when students
perceive they are treated unfairly and with disrespect).
19. See David C. Anderson, Curriculum, Culture, and Community: The
Challenge of School Violence, 24 CRIME & JuST. 317, 341, 343-46 (1998)
(maintaining that humanistic approaches to discipline more effectively reduce
school crime than coercive measures); see also infra Section IL
20. See infra Section III.
21. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., Restricted Use Data Licenses,
http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). NCES defines
"restricted-access" data as data that contains "individually identifiable
information that are confidential and protected by law. This information is not
publicly released." NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., Statistical Standard Program:
Getting Started, http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last
visited Sept. 29, 2012). The restricted-use data "have a higher level of detail in the
data compared to public-use data files." Id. NCES provides restricted-use datasets
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survey responses on crime and safety from over 2,500 public
school principals throughout the United States.22
The results of this empirical analysis raise concerns that
many public schools may be conducting searches that are
either (1) unconstitutional under current precedent or (2)
inconsistent with good educational policy. Specifically, the
SSOCS data suggest that during the 2009-2010 school year,
approximately seventy secondary schools in the sample and an
estimated 1,932 secondary schools throughout the United
States conducted suspicionless searches of students' belongings
without reporting any incidents relating to using, possessing,
or distributing weapons, alcohol, or drugs. 23 Furthermore, the
estimated number of schools that conducted suspicionless
searches of students' belongings sharply climbs for schools that
report only a minor problem with drugs, alcohol, or weapons.2"*
Although these preliminary findings signal that some
schools may be violating students' Fourth Amendment rights,
more research is needed to draw clearer conclusions. As
explained more fully below, the primary survey question on
which this analysis is based—whether "it was a practice in the
principal's school to . . . [pjerform one or more random sweeps
for contraband (e.g., drugs or weapons), but not including dog
sniffs"—is somewhat ambiguous.^5 That question does not
to certain researchers in qualified organizations. Id. In order to qualify, "an
organization must provide a justification for access to the restricted-use data,
submit the required legal documents, agree to keep the data safe from
unauthorized disclosures at all times, and to participate fully in unannounced,
unscheduled inspections of the researcher's office to ensure compliance with the
terms of the License and the Security Plan form." Id.\ see also NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STAT., Applying for a Restricted-use Data License, http://nces.ed.gov/
statprog/instruct_apply.asp?type=rl (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
22. NEIMAN & HILL, supra note 6, at 1; SALLY A. RUDDY ET AL., 2007-2008
SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY: SURVEY DOCUMENTATION FOR PUBLIC-
U S E DATA FILE USERS 1 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010307.pdf.
23. See infra Section III.D, Figures 1 & 2. This is an increase from the 2007-
2008 school year, where approximately sixty secondary schools in the sample and
an estimate of 1,645 secondary schools throughout the United States conducted
random, suspicionless searches of students' belongings without reporting any
incidents relating to using, possessing, or distributing weapons, alcohol, or drugs.
24. See infra Section III.D, Figures 1 & 2.
25. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY
PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE: 2009-2010 SCHOOL YEAR 5 [hereinafter 2009-2010
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE], http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010_
Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE: 2007-2008
SCHOOL YEAR 5 [hereinafter 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE], available at
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2008_ Questionnaire.pdf (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012).
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allow researchers to precisely ascertain (a) the nature of the
"random sweeps"; (b) the conditions under which school
officials performed the searches; (c) whether the "contraband"
searched for was something other than weapons or drugs, such
as stolen money; or (d) whether school officials conducted the
search on the general student body or on a subset of students
that had a lower expectation of privacy.^^ Nevertheless, these
preliminary findings demonstrate the need to conduct more
research in order to probe more deeply into the types of
searches school officials perform and why they perform them.
Additionally, and more disturbingly, the analysis suggests
that during the 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 school years, schools
with higher minority student populations were more likely
than schools with lower minority populations to perform these
searches without reporting any incidents relating to weapons,
alcohol, or drugs. ^ ' These findings hold true even when taking
into account school officials' perceptions of the levels of crime
where students live and where the school is located.^^ The fact
that minority students are more often subject to intrusive
searches without apparent justification raises serious concerns
that schools are perpetuating racial inequalities.^^ Such
practices also incorrectly teach students that white students
are privileged, leading to increased racial tensions and an
undesirable society that harms people of all races. ^ ^
Furthermore, even absent Fourth Amendment violations, the
fact that many schools perform suspicionless searches without
26. See also infra Section III.A-D.
27. See infra Section III.E & Table 2.
28. See infra Section III.E & Table 2. These results also may raise legal issues
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VÎ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
That analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but will be the subject of future
research projects.
29. See AARON KUPCHIK & GEOFF K. WARD, REPRODUCING SOCIAL
INEQUALITY THROUGH SCHOOL SECURITY: EFFECTS OF RACE AND CLASS ON
SCHOOL SECURITY MEASURES 7, http://www.edweek.org/media/kupchikward-
02security.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (describing how strict security
measures condition minorities to accept intensive surveillance by the government
and limit their future opportunities for success); see also infra Section II.B.
30. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Ooodwill Isn't
Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20-39 (1999) (describing how persistent racial
inequalities feed minorities' skepticism of white society's commitment to racial
equality, which leads to racial tension, anger, and a society that is undesirable to
all races); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and
Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 33, 42 (1997) (explaining that children
learn about race relations from us, and adults should be especially cautious not to
teach minorities that they are racially inferior or teach white children that they
are racially superior).
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reporting a single incident relating to weapons, drugs, or
alcohol during the school year raises pedagogical concerns,
especially because there are more effective ways to prevent
school crime that do not harm the learning environment.3'
Finally, this Article recommends that the Supreme Court
and other federal circuit courts follow the Eighth Circuit's lead
by requiring school officials to provide concrete evidence of a
serious substance abuse or weapons problem before permitting
schools to engage in intrusive search practices. ^ ^ In addition, it
urges school officials and policymakers to consider alternative,
more effective means for reducing school violence and drug
abuse rather than resorting to coercive methods that rely on
punishment and fear.
This Article proceeds in four sections. Section I evaluates
the constitutionality of suspicionless searches in public schools
and concludes that such searches violate the Fourth
Amendment unless school officials have particularized evidence
of a substance abuse or weapons problem in their schools.
Section II provides a normative evaluation of strict security
measures and concludes that such measures are inconsistent
with good educational policy and practice, particularly when
applied disproportionally to minority students. Section III
presents an empirical analysis of two restrictive-use datasets
from the Department of Education. After evaluating the
empirical results against the legal framework presented in
Section I, it concludes that the empirical findings raise
concerns that some public schools may be conducting
unconstitutional searches. Section III also presents empirical
results suggesting that these potentially unconstitutional
searches are more likely to take place in schools with higher
minority populations than in schools with lower minority
populations, raising additional concerns. Section IV discusses
the implications of the empirical findings against the legal and
normative analyses. It also argues that the Supreme Court
should resolve any ambiguity in its jurisprudence by requiring
school officials to have particularized evidence of a serious
substance abuse or weapons problem before permitting schools
to engage in intrusive search practices. This Article concludes
by providing a roadmap to conduct further research on these
important issues.
3 L See infra Section ILA.
32. See infra Section IV.
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I. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES FOR EVALUATING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERFORMING RANDOM, SUSPICION-
LESS SEARCHES OF STUDENTS* BELONGINGS
While students do not relinquish their Fourth Amendment
rights upon entering the schoolhouse doors, ^ ^ the Supreme
Court halances students' rights of privacy against the states'
interests in providing a safe and orderly school environment. ^ ^^
In recent years, the Court has determined that the Fourth
Amendment permits school officials to randomly drug test
student athletes and students involved in extracurricular
activities. ^ ^ The Court justified those searches because it
determined that (1) students involved in athletics or
extracurricular activities have decreased privacy expectations,
(2) drug tests are "minimally intrusive," and (3) school officials
have an important government interest in deterring drug use
and preserving order in schools. ^ ^ These rulings no doubt have
emboldened school officials to perform other types of random,
suspicionless searches at school. ^ ^ However, school officials'
scope of authority under the Fourth Amendment to conduct
random, suspicionless searches of students' belongings remains
unsettled. This section discusses the foundational cases for
evaluating the constitutionality of random, suspicionless
searches of students' belongings. In sum, it argues that these
searches are not permitted under the Fourth Amendment
absent particularized evidence of a weapons or substance abuse
problem.
A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court addressed the
competing interests of students' privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the interests of states in creating a
33. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1985); Bd. of Educ. of Ind.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002).
34. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-^3; see also Dupre, supra note 10, at 86-93;
Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 11 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 872-73
(2012); Levin, supra note 10, at 1648-49 (1986); Ryan, supra note 10, at 1360-63.
35. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 838 (permitting random, suspicionless drug testing
on students involved in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (permitting random, suspicionless drug testing on
student athletes).
36. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-38; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-66.
37. See infra Section III.C, Table 1.
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safe and orderly environment conducive to learning in public
schools.^^ In T.L.O., a New Jersey high school teacher spotted
fourteen-year-old T.L.O. and another student smoking in the
bathroom.^9 The teacher escorted the two girls to the
principal's office and- met. with Vice Principal Theodore
Choplick.'^ o Upon questioning, T.L.O.'s companion admitted
that she had been smoking, but T.L.O. denied the
accusations.'*' Mr. Choplick brought T.L.O. into his private
office and examined the contents of her purse.''^ He found in
her purse a pack of cigarettes. "^^ When he reached into the
purse to remove the cigarettes, he noticed a package of
cigarette rolling papers, so he proceeded to search the purse
more thoroughly to uncover other evidence of drug use."*"* Mr.
Choplick found marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic
bags, a substantial quantity of money, an index card containing
a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters
suggesting that T.L.O. was dealing marijuana.'*^ Mr. Choplick
notified T.L.O's mother and turned the evidence over to the
38. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. Before this case, a number of courts did not take a
middle position, but gave full force to one interest over the other. See id. at 333
n.2. For example, some courts invoked the in loco parentis doctrine, concluding
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to in-school searches because school
officials acted in the place of parents during, school hours and, thus, did not act as
an arm of the government. See id; D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982); In re Thomas G., 90 Cal. Rptr.' 361 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); R.C.M. v.
State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex..App. 1983). The Supreme' Court in T.L.O. expressly
rejected this reasoning, holding that "[i]n carrying out searches and other
disciplinary functions . . . school officials act as representatives of the State, not
merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents'
immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-
37. Other courts held that the Fourth Amendment applied in full force to searches
conducted by school officials, at least under certain circumstances, requiring such
officials to meet the probable cause standard. See M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589
(2d Cir. 1979); State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317, 323 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809
(1975). And still other courts found a middle ground, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment applied to searches conducted by public school officials, but the
special needs of the government to maintain an appropriate learning environment
warranted a standard less exacting than probable cause. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
333 n.2; Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek
Ind. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47
(N.D.N.Y 1977). See generally JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 9.08(3)(b) (2012)
(describing the state of the law prior to T.L.O.).
39. r.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
40. M
41 . Id. . • • •
42. Id. ,. • •
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. '
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police."^^ T.L.O. eventually confessed that she had been selling
marijuana at the high school, and on the basis of that
confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State
brought delinquency charges against her in juvenile court."**^
T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search
of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment,"^^ but the
Supreme Court disagreed.'*^
The Court evaluated the constitutionality of the search by
balancing T.L.O's expectation of privacy against the school's
need to maintain an orderly environment. ^ ^ The Court first
explained that students have legitimate expectations of privacy
in the personal items they bring to school.^' The court reasoned
that a "search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried
out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective
expectations of privacy."^^ According to the Court,
"schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a
variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no
reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights
to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school
grounds."^^ At the same time, the Court recognized the school
officials' interest in maintaining an orderly school environment
conducive to learning, particularly in light of the fact that
"drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major
social problems."^'*
To strike a balance between the school's need to maintain
an orderly environment and students' legitimate expectation of
privacy, the Court held that school officials are not required to
obtain a warrant before searching a student, and a school
official's level of suspicion need not rise to the level of "probable
cause."^5 Rather, the constitutionality of a search of a student's
belongings depends on its reasonableness under the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 329.
at 333.
at 337.
at 337-39.
at 337-38.
at 339.
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, N A T ' L I N S T . OF
EDUC, VIOLENT SCHOOLS—THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1977)).
55. Id. at 340-41 .
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circumstances.^^ According to the Court, the determination of
"reasonableness" involves a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether "the .
. . action was justified at its inception;" and (2) "whether the
search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.'"^^ A search is "justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school," and a search is "permissible
in scope" when "the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."^^ Using this framework, the Court concluded that
the search was constitutional.^^ Mr. Choplick had a reasonable
suspicion that T.L.O.'s purse contained cigarettes, and once he
observed a package of rolling papers upon removing the
cigarettes, he was justified to extend his search to the rest of
the contents ofthe purse.^ "^
T.L.O. has been criticized for not expressly requiring
school officials to have an individualized suspicion to conduct
valid searches.^' Nevertheless, the Court still recognized that
students enjoy the protections offered by the Fourth
Amendment in schools and have an expectation of privacy in
the belongings they bring to school. ^ ^ As the Court
acknowledged, to hold otherwise would equate the Fourth
Amendment rights of schoolchildren with those of prisoners,
who "retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their
cells."^^ The Court explained that the "prisoner and the
56. Id. at 341.
57. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court recently
upheld this two-fold inquiry in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557
U.S. 370 (2009). In Safford, the Court found that a strip search ordered by school
administrators on a 13-year-old girl to uncover forbidden prescription and over-
the-counter drugs was unconstitutional, but held that the official was entitled to
qualified immunity from liability. Id.
58. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id. at 343-48.
61. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 924 (finding that T.L.O. portended a
"gloomy future for student privacy" by not expressly requiring individualized
suspicion to conduct searches of students).
62. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38 ("A search of a child's person or of a closed
purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out
on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy.").
63. Id. at 338.
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schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated
by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration. We
are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need
be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."^'* In
subsequent decisions, however, students' Fourth Amendment
rights continued to be tested.
B. Vernonia School District 47 J v. Acton
Ten years after T.L.O., in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton,^^ the Court determined that individualized suspicion is
not necessary to conduct what it deemed as "minimally
intrusive" searches of students when certain conditions are
present.^^ Evaluating the constitutionality of a random drug
testing program on student athletes, the Court balanced three
factors: (1) "the scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at
issue"; (2) the "character of the intrusion that is complained of;
and (3) the "nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern at issue . . . , and the efficacy of this means for meeting
it."67
In Vernonia, the Vernonia School District claimed that
teachers and administrators "observed a sharp increase in drug
use" in the mid-to-late 1980s.^^ In particular, students "began
to speak out about their attraction to the drug culture and
boast that there was nothing the school could do about it."^^
Not only did student athletes participate in drug use, but also
the district court concluded that they were the 'leaders of the
drug culture."^^ The district court explained:
[A] large segment of the student body, particularly those
involved in inter-scholastic athletics, was in a state of
64. Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 669 (1971)); see also Doe ex rel. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 353
(8th Cir. 2004) ("Unlike prisoners, who 'retain no legitimate • expectations of
privacy in their cells' after having been convicted and incarcerated . . . public
school students have traditionally been treated as presumptively responsible
persons entitled to some modicum of privacy in their personal belongings, at least
to the extent that recognition of such privacy interests does not unduly burden the
maintenance of security and order in schools.") (citations omitted).
65. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
66. Id. at 653.
67. Id. at 646, 658, 660.
68. Id. at 648.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 649.
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rebellion. Disciplinary actions had reached 'epidemic
proportions.' The coincidence of an almost three-fold
increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports
along with the staffs direct observations of students using
drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the
administration to the inescapable conclusion that the
rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well
as tbe students' misperceptions about tbe drug culture.^'
School officials decided to implement a student athlete
drug testing program.^ ^ Students wishing to participate in
interscholastic sports and their parents were required to sign a
drug testing consent form.^ ^ Under the program, all student
athletes would be tested at the beginning of the season.^ '*
Additionally, each week of the season, a student, under the
supervision of two adults, would randomly select several
students for drug testing. ^ ^ In the fall of 1991, James Acton
signed up to play football, but he was denied participation
because he and his parents refused to sign the drug testing
consent form.^ ^ The Actons filed suit, claiming that Vernonia's
drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment, but the
Court disagreed. ^ ^
The Court recognized that the school search approved in
T.L.O. was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, over a scathing dissent by Justice O'Connor,^ ^
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not impose that
71. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D.
Or. 1992)).
72. Id. at 649-50.
73. Id. at 650.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. . ,
77. Id. at 651-52.
78. Id. at 653. Justice O'Connor was highly critical of the Court's decision to
dispense with the individualized suspicion requirement. She reasoned, "[N]owhere
is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffectual
than in the school context. In most schools, the entire pool of potential search
targets—students—is under constant supervision by teachers and administrators
and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms . . . ." Id. at 678
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). She further reasoned, "The great
irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District
introduced to justify its suspicionless drug testing program consisted of first- or
second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly
gave rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use—and thus that would have
justified a drug-related search under our T.L.O. decision." Id. at 678-79
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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requirement.^^ Under its new framework, the Court first
considered "the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
search . . . intrudes."^^ While acknowledging that children
"assuredly do not *shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate,"'^' the Court explained that students'
constitutional rights, including those under the Fourth
Amendment, are diminished in light of the schools' custodial
and tutelary responsibilities. ^ ^ Next, the Court explained that
privacy expectations for student athletes are even further
diminished because: (1) "there is an element of communal
undress inherent in athletic participation[;]"^3 and (2) by
choosing to participate in school athletics, students "voluntarily
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than
that imposed on students generally."^"*
Second, the Court considered the intrusiveness of
collecting and evaluating student urine samples. ^ ^ The Court
first reasoned that the conditions imposed by Vernonia's drug
testing policy imposed only a negligible degree of intrusion
because the conditions were almost identical to conditions
commonly encountered in public restrooms.^^ Male students
"produce[d] samples at a urinal along a wall" and "remain[ed]
fully clothed and [were] only observed from behind, if at all."
79. Id. at 653 ("The school search we approved in T.L.O. while not based on
probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we
expUcitly acknowledged, however, 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion.'") (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
n.8 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at 654.
81. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
82. Id. at 656 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975)) (holding that
students' due process rights are diminished in schools); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that students' First Amendment
rights to express themselves in school newspapers are diminished); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 V. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (concluding that students' First
Amendment rights to express themselves on school property are diminished); see
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ("Fourth
Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are
different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot
disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.").
83. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (internal quotations marks omitted). For
example, school athletes are required to suit up, shower, and change in the public
locker rooms that lack privacy accommodations. Id.
84. Id. For example, students must take a preseason physical exam, acquire
insurance coverage, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with
certain rules estabhshed by the coaches of the athletic program. Id.
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id.
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Female students "produce [d] samples in an enclosed stall, with
a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of
tampering."^^ The Court next concluded that information
disclosed from the urinalyses was an insignificant invasion of
privacy. ^ ^ It reasoned that the purpose of the test was only to
look for drugs, "not for whether the student is, for example,
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic." ^ ^ In addition, the Court took
into account the fact that the test results were disclosed only to
a limited number of school authorities, not to law enforcement
officers. ^ *^
Third, the Court considered "the nature and immediacy of
the governmental concern at issue . . . , and the efficacy of this
means for meeting it."^' The Court held that the nature of
Vernonia's concern— t^o deter student drug use—^was
"important . . . indeed, perhaps compelling." ^ ^ According to the
Court, the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs are particularly severe to school-aged children, who are
still maturing, and the risks of immediate harm to school
athletes are particularly high.^^ Moreover, "the effects of a
drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational
process is disrupted."^^ The Court also found that Vernonia's
concern was immediate. "[A] large segment of the student body,
particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a
state of rebellion, disciplinary actions had reached epidemic
proportions, and the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and
drug abuse as well as by the students' misperceptions about
the drug culture."^^ Regarding efficacy, the Court held that it
was "self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role
model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to
athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes
do not use drugs."^^
Vernonia demonstrates that a school's random,
suspicionless search practice will he upheld when the students
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
658.
658-60.
658.
660.
661.
661-62.
662.
662-63 (internal quotation marked omitted).
663.
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subject to the searches have diminished privacy expectations,
the searches are relatively unobtrusive, and the school is
experiencing severe problems with student crime. ^ ^ Further,
the Court's insistence that Vernonia demonstrate an
immediate need to randomly drug test student athletes should
not be disregarded. The Court left open the possibility that a
mere concern that students are bringing drugs and weapons to
school, without proof, would not justify searches considered to
be highly intrusive, such as searching through students'
belongings. This is especially true when intrusive searches are
performed on students who have greater expectations of
privacy than student athletes.^^
C. Board of Education of Independent School District No.
92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls
In Board of Education of Independent School District No.
92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,^^ the Court arguably
limited students' Fourth Amendment rights even further. The
Court held that a school district did not need to show that it
had an identifiable drug abuse problem as a condition to
randomly drug test students involved in extracurricular
activities.'^ *^
In Earls, the Pottawatomie County School District
implemented a pohcy that required middle and high school
students to consent to random drug testing in order to be
eligible to participate in extracurricular activities.'^' Two
students and their parents brought an action against
Pottawatomie, challenging the drug testing policy as violating
their rights under the Fourth Amendment.'^^ fhe students
argued that Pottawatomie failed to identify a special need for
implementing its random drug testing program because it had
97. Though the Court did not address searches for weapons, lower courts have
logically concluded that deterring the use of weapons in schools also is an
important government interest. See, e.g.. Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Schs., 792 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1194-95 (D.N.M. 2011) (acknowledging that deterring students
from bringing weapons to a school event is a legitimate government interest).
98. Id. at 657.
99. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
100. Id. at 836 (citing Earls ex rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch.
Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)).
101. Id. at 826.
102. / d at 826-27.
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not demonstrated a proven drug problem at the school. "^ ^
The district court granted summary judgment for
Pottawatomie, noting that although Pottawatomie did "not
show a drug problem of epidemic proportions," the district had
a history of drug abuse problems starting in 1970 that
presented "legitimate cause for concern."" '^* The Tenth Circuit
reversed, determining that Pottawatomie's random drug
testing policy was unconstitutional because Pottawatomie had
failed to demonstrate that there was an identifiable drug abuse
problem among students participating in extracurricular
activities. "^ 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit in a 5-4 decision. '06
Justice Thomas's majority opinion largely mirrored Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Vernonia, balancing the same three
factors. 0^7 First, the Court held that students' rights to privacy
are necessarily diminished in light of the school's custodial
responsibility, i*^^ and students who participate in
extracurricular activities already voluntarily submit to various
intrusions of privacy associated with the respective
activities. 109 Next, the Court explained that because the
conditions imposed by the district's drug testing policy were
nearly identical to those in Vernonia, there was "negligible
intrusion" on the students' rights to privacy.'^^
Regarding the nature of Pottawatomie's concerns, the
Court, as in Vernonia, considered the need to prevent student
drug use to be "important." ^  The Court noted that "the
nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a
pressing concern in every school."''^ With respect to
immediacy, the Court concluded that Pottawatomie "presented
specific evidence of drug use.""^ For example, teachers
103. Id. at 827.
104. Earls ex rel. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 115 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001),
rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
105. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278.
106. Earls, 536 U.S. at 824-25.
107. Id. at 830-38.
108. Id. at 830—31 ("A student's privacy interest is limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health,
and safety.").
109. Id. at 831-32.
110. 7d. at 832-34.
111. 7d. at 834.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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testified that they observed students who appeared to be under
the influence of drugs and teachers heard students speaking
openly about drugs. Additionally, a drug-sniffing dog found
marijuana near a school parking lot, police officers found drugs
or drug paraphernalia in a student's car, and the school board
president received calls by members of the community to
discuss the "drug situation."""^ However, the Court held that it
was unnecessary for the district to identify a drug abuse
problem before imposing a suspicionless drug testing policy,
although "[a] demonstrated problem of drug abuse . . . [did]
shore up . . . [the] special need for a suspicionless general
search program.""^ According to the Court, "it would make
little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial
portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was
allowed to institute a drug testing program designed to deter
drug use.""^
Justice Thomas's statements might lead one to conclude
that it is not necessary for schools to present particularized
evidence of a substance abuse or weapons problem before
performing suspicionless searches on students. ""^  However,
Earls did not address the standard that schools must meet in
order to conduct searches considered to be "highly intrusive,"
such as searches of students' belongings."^ Additionally, Earls
114. Id. at 834-35.
115. Id. at 835-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. /d at 836.
117. Indeed, at least one state court and two other state court judges in
concurring and dissenting opinions have so concluded in the context of evaluating
school drug-testing policies. See Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ, 826 A.2d 624, 662 (N.J. 2003) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) ("In addressing
the 'immediacy' of the government's concerns, the Court accepted the school
district's generalized assertion that 'the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war
against drugs a pressing concern in every school.' The Court eschewed any
requirement that a particularized degree of drug problem be demonstrated in the
schools notwithstanding that seven years earlier the Court relied on such fmdings
in its decision in Vernonia") (quoting Earls, 536 U.S. at 834); Theodore v. Del.
Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 88 (Pa. 2003) ("Although there are references in the
Earls litigation to record evidence of drug use at the schools involved, a close
reading of Justice Thomas's opinion suggests that the Court would have upheld
the policy regardless."); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995,
1009 (Wash. 2008) (Madsen, J., concurring) ("Rather than requiring that a school
demonstrate an actual problem with student drug abuse, the Court essentially
took judicial notice of the issue, observing that the 'war against drugs' is a
'pressing concern' in every school.") (citations omitted).
118. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985) ("A search of a
child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of
subjective expectations of privacy."); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380
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did not address circumstances under which all students—not
just athletes or those involved in other extracurricular
activities—were potentially subject to these searches. Indeed,
in a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer emphasized that the
district's drug testing program was justified because it did not
subject the entire school to testing. "^ Rather, the program
"preserve[d] an option for the conscientious objector" to
withdraw from his or her participation in extracurricular
activities—an option less severe than expulsion from school.'20
Finally, Earls did not address a situation where school officials
conducted searches of students' belongings without presenting
any evidence at all of a substance abuse or weapons problem. '2'
These open questions would be addressed by the Eighth Circuit
a short time later.
D. Doe V. Little Rock School District
Two years after Earls, in Doe v. Little Rock School District,
the Eighth Circuit evaluated a school district's practice of
conducting random, suspicionless searches of students'
belongings.'22 The Eighth Circuit is the only federal circuit
court to directly address this issue.'23 It held that these
searches were unreasonable because Little Rock School District
could provide no more than "generalized concerns about the
existence of weapons and drugs in schools."'2^
In Little Rock, as part of Little Rock's routine practice of
subjecting students to random, suspicionless searches, Jane
Doe and her classmates were ordered to leave their classroom
after removing everything from their pockets and putting all of
their belongings, including their backpacks and purses, on
F.3d 349, 354-55 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a search through a student's
belongings is "highly intrusive").
119. Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's
concurrence was necessary to reach a 5-4 majority. See ¿d. at 842.
120. Id.
121. See Robert M. Bloom, The Story o/Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls;
Drug Testing in the Public Schools, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 337, 356-57
(Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008) (explaining that Earls
was not clear regarding how much of a drug problem a school must have to justify
suspicionless drug testing because the Court did justify the district's drug testing
program, at least to some extent, on the district's drug problem).
122. 380F.3d349.
123. A handful of district and state courts have also addressed this issue with
mixed results. Outside of the California state appellate courts, they have
generally followed the reasoning set forth in Little Rock. See infra note 144.
124. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 356.
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their desks. '^ ^ While the students waited outside the classroom
in the hallway, school officials scanned students' bodies with
metal detectors and then searched, by hand, through the items
that the students left behind.'^^ During this search, a school
official discovered marijuana in a container in Ms. Doe's
purse.'2^ Ms. Doe brought a class action, claiming that Little
Rock's suspicionless search practices violated the students'
Fourth Amendment rights.'^^
The Eighth Circuit applied the. framework developed in
Vernonia and Earls to evaluate the constitutionahty of Little
Rock's search practice. First, the court examined the scope of
students' expectation of privacy, acknowledging that public
school students have lesser expectations of privacy than adults
because of the government's responsibilities "'as guardian and
tutor of children entrusted to its care."''^^ Nevertheless, the
court recognized that students have a legitimate need to bring
personal items into schools, where they are required to spend
much of their time under compulsory attendance laws.'^^ The
court reasoned that unlike prisoners who have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in their cells, "public school students
have traditionally been treated as presumptively responsible
persons entitled to some modicum of privacy in their personal
belongings, at least to the extent that recognition of such
privacy interests does not unduly burden the maintenance of
security and order in schools."'^' Furthermore, while the court
recognized that drug use and school violence have become
major social problems nationwide, it held that the situation
had not yet reached the point where students in schools have
no legitimate expectations of privacy at all.'^^
In connection with students' expectation of privacy, the
court also highlighted the difference between conducting
suspicionless searches on certain segments of the student
population, such as student athletes or those involved in
extracurricular activities, and conducting those searches on
125. Id. at 351.
126. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist, No. 4:99CV00386, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26439, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 2003).
127. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 351.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 353 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665
(1995)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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public school students generally.'^^ For example, the court
pointed out that students participating in athletics and
extracurricular activities "choose to participate in a 'closely
regulated industry,' in that both groups voluntarily subject
themselves to 'intrusions upon normal rights and privileges,
including privacy."'i^'* The court reasoned that by choosing to
participate in athletics or extracurricular activities, students
"waive certain privacy expectations that they would otherwise
have as students in exchange for the privilege of participating
in the activity."'3^ In contrast, general students have not made
a "voluntary tradeoff of some of their privacy interests in
exchange for a benefit or privilege."'^^
Second, the court considered the intrusiveness of the
search, concluding that searching through students' belongings
was "highly intrusive."'^^ The court explained that students
bring to school items of a personal or private nature in their
pockets and bags and "must surely feel uncomfortable or
embarrassed when officials decide to rifle through their
personal belongings."'^^ Thus, any expectations of privacy
interest retained by students were "wholly obliterated" by
Little Rock's search practices, because all of the students'
belongings may be searched at any time without notice,
individualized suspicion, or limits. ^^ ^
Third, the court considered the nature and immediacy of
the school officials' concerns. While the court acknowledged
that Little Rock's concern to protect the safety and welfare of
its students was "important enough," it held that Little Rock
had not demonstrated that its concerns were immediate.''*'^
Specifically, Little Rock had failed to put anything in the
record "regarding the magnitude of any problems with weapons
or drugs that it ha[d] actually experienced."'"*' The court
133. Id. at 354.
134. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831-32 (2002)).
135. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 354.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. M at 355.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 355-56.
141. Id. aX 356. The court noted that in both Vernonia and Earls, the school
districts provided particularized evidence to "shore up" their immediacy concerns.
Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 835 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63
(1995)).
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emphasized that generahzed concerns about the existence of
drugs and weapons were insufficient.'"^^ pj\ school officials
have an interest in minimizing the effects of drugs and
weapons in their schools, but having a "mere apprehension" of
drugs and weapons does not entitle school officials to conduct
suspicionless, full-scale searches of students' personal
belongings.''*^ Thus, under the test set forth by the Supreme
Court, Little Rock's practice of searching through students'
belongings to prevent them from bringing drugs and weapons
to schools was struck down as unconstitutional.''*'^
142. Id. In making this determination, the court distinguished Thompson v.
Carthage School District, 87 F.3d 979, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1996). There, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a blanket search similar to the searches conducted in Little Rock
where school officials had received information that the students' safety was in
jeopardy, causing an immediate need for blanket, intrusive searches. Specifically,
there were "fresh cuts" on the seats of a school bus, and students reported that
there was a gun at school that morning. Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982.
143. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 356.
144. Id. at 356-57. A number of district and state courts also have addressed
this issue and, outside of the California state courts, they have followed the
general reasoning found in Little Rock. For example, in Hough v. Shakopee Public
School, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009), the court held that searches
through students' backpacks and purses attending a public special needs school
were unconstitutional because the school could not establish that such intrusive
searches were needed to maintain a safe and orderly classroom environment. In
Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1197 (D.N.M. 2011), the
court upheld the search through the belongings of a student attending a school
prom because, similar to students participating in athletics or extra-curricular
activities, students choosing to participate in the school prom have a more limited
expectation of privacy than students who are compelled to attend school. In In re
F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 367 (Pa. 1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
that a random, suspicionless search of a student's belongings was constitutional
in light of the "alarming trend of the increased violence" in the Philadelphia
School District, and given this alarming trend there was an immediate need to
take such precautionary measures. However, in In re Joshua E., No. B171643,
2004 WL 2914984, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004), the California state
appellate court held that a random, suspiciontess search of a student's backpack
was constitutional in light of the school's compelling interest to keep weapons off
campus. There, the court did not discuss whether the school had particularized
evidence of a drug or weapon problem, perhaps because the student did not bring
this challenge or because it was obvious that the school experienced such issues.
See id. In In re Daniel A., No. B232404, 2012 WL 2126539, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 13, 2012) (quoting In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 245 (Cal. 2001)), the
California appellate court held that the school's practice of searching students'
backpacks in randomly selected classrooms did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because, although the school had failed to put forth evidence demonstrating a
drug or weapons problem, the government's interest in maintaining a safe and
drug-free campus was of the "highest order."
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E. A Brief Legal Summary of the Foundational Cases
The Supreme Court has not directly determined the
circumstances under which schools may perform suspicionless
searches of students' personal belongings. Nevertheless, an
analysis of T.L.O., Vernonia, Earls, and Little Rock leads to the
conclusion that schools should have particularized evidence of a
substance abuse or weapons problem to justify performing
these intrusive searches, unless the school official reasonably
believes that students are in immediate danger. ^ '^ ^
As set forth in Vernonia and Earls, the framework for
evaluating suspicionless searches conducted by school officials
requires the balancing of three factors: (1) the students'
legitimate expectations of privacy; (2) the intrusiveness of the
search; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the school's
concern. '"^ ^ While students have a lesser expectation of privacy
than adults, they nonetheless retain an expectation of privacy
145. In most cases where courts have upheld intrusive, suspicionless searches
as constitutional without particularization, the aspect of "danger" was present.
For example, in Thompson, 87 F.3d at 982-83, the Eighth Circuit upheld a school-
wide search where school officials had received information that their students
were in danger. There, a school bus driver informed the principal "that there were
fresh cuts on seats of her hus." Id. at 980. Fearing that a student was carrying a
knife on school grounds, the school principal initiated a search of all male
students in grades six to twelve. Id. The Eighth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of that search, concluding that the broad search for the knife was
reasonable given the immediate, pressing concerns for students' safety. Id. at
982-83. Similarly, in Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, H F. Supp. 2d 177, 180
(D.R.I. 1998), the court upheld a broad, sweeping search in an effort to locate a
13.5- inch-long knife that was missing from the school cafeteria. When a cafeteria
worker informed the assistant principal that the knife was missing, the assistant
principal and the lunchroom workers conducted pat-downs on all the students
present in the cafeteria. Id. The court, emplojring the framework discussed in
Vernonia and Earls, concluded that the "school officials had ample reason to be
concerned about the safety and welfare of the children entrusted to their care,"
and, under these circumstances, it could not "be disputed that immediate action
was required . . . given the magnitude and immediacy of the potential threat." Id.
at 182. See also In re Freddy A., No. B192555, 2007 WL 1139955, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 18, 2007) (concluding that a random search of student was
constitutional where there was a student riot on campus two days earlier, and the
school had received a tip that someone may have had a knife on campus); In re
Isaiah B. v. State, 500 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Wis. 1993) (upholding search of student's
coat inside his locker where large, heavy object was felt inside the coat after
several incidents involving guns on campus lead administration to conduct search
of all lockers).
146. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995); Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 830,
832, 834 (2002).
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in the personal items they bring to school, i**^  And while
students' expectations of privacy must be balanced against the
state's need to maintain an orderly learning environment, as
explained in T.L.O. and Little Rock, drug use and school
violence have not become "so dire that students in the schools
may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy" at all.*'*^
In addition, legitimate expectations of privacy are higher
for students in the general population than for students
engaged in athletics or extracurricular activities. ^ '^ ^ Students
who compete in those activities voluntarily subject themselves
to "intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy," and thereby waive certain privacy expectations that
students otherwise enjoy.'^ujn contrast, students who are
required to attend schools under compulsory attendance laws
make no such waiver J^i Further, students who fail or refuse to
participate in a school-wide drug testing program are subject to
suspension or expulsion from school—consequences that are
much more severe than being excluded from participating in
school athletics or extracurricular activities. '^ ^
147. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) ("[SJchoolchildren may
find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontrahand items,
and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to
privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds."); id. at 337-
38 ("A search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her
person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy."); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-
56 (acknowledging that "children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights
. . . at the schoolhouse gate,"' students' constitutional rights, including those
under the Fourth Amendment, are diminished to "what is appropriate for children
in school") (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir.
2004) ("[Pjublic school students have traditionally been treated as presumptively
responsible persons entitled to some modicum of privacy in their personal
belongings, at least to the extent that recognition of such privacy interests does
not unduly burden the maintenance of security and order in schools."); see also In
re Adam, 697 N.E.2d 1100, 1108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("Indeed, one cannot
envision any rule which minimizes the value of our Constitutional freedoms in the
minds of our youth more dramatically than a statute proclaiming that juveniles
have no right to privacy in their personal possessions.").
148. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338; Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 353.
149. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57; Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 354; see also
Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the school
district's drug testing program was justified because it did not subject the entire
school to drug testing).
150. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 354.
151. See Little Rock, 380 F. 3d at 354.
152. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that
exclusion from extracurricular activities for refusing to be tested is serious but
less severe than expulsion from school); see also Bloom, supra note 121, at 356
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Regarding the character of the intrusion, searches of
students' personal belongings are "highly intrusive," more so
than random drug tests, metal detectors, or dog sniffs.'^^ Drug
tests, according to Vernonia and Earls, are relatively
unobtrusive because the circumstances of those searches are
almost identical to conditions commonly encountered in public
restrooms.154 Metal detectors or dog sniffs, according to Little
Rock, are less intrusive because they do not involve rummaging
through students' personal belongings by hand.'^^ Conversely,
(arguing that the "costlier consequences of an all-student drug testing policy . . .
add weight to the privacy intrusion side of the scale" because of the heightened
penalties for failing a drug test).
153. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38 ("A search of a child's person or of a closed
purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out
on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy."); Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 355 (holding that students' privacy interests in
their personal belongings brought to school are "wholly obliterated" when school
officials search through students' bags, purses, or items in their pockets); Hough
V. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (D. Minn. 2009) (determining
searches through students' backpacks and purses were "extraordinarily
intrusive"); see also In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 368 (Pa. 1999) (Flaherty, C.J.,
concurring) ("When one is forced to empty his pockets and to have his coat and
baggage searched, the intrusion is anything but minimal.").
154. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832-33 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
155. See Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 355 ("Full-scale searches that involve people
rummaging through personal belongings concealed within a container are
manifestly more intrusive than searches effected by using metal detectors or
dogs."); see also In re F.B., 726 A.2d at 366 (holding that the intrusion imposed by
a search by means of a metal scanner was minimal because "[t]he actual character
of the intrusion suffered by the students during the search is no greater than that
regularly experienced by millions of people as they pass through an airport" or in
government buildings); In re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 887 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (determining that searches conducted using a hand-held metal detector
were minimally intrusive); Florida v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (same); Illinois v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540, 545 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (same);
People V. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (same). In fact,
several courts have held that dog sniffs of property do not constitute searches at
all. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (holding that a dog sniff
of property did not implicate legitimate privacy interests under the Fourth
Amendment); Doran v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 616 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192
(D.N.H. 2009) (holding that a dog sniff of property of student did not amount to an
illegal search under the Fourth Amendment). However, the evaluation of dog
sniffs of students' person has caused a sharp division among the courts. Compare
Doe V. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (holding that random,
suspicionless dog sniffs on students in their classrooms was not unconstitutional
because dog sniffs did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert,
denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981), with B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d
1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that because "the body and its odors are
highly personal," dog sniffs on a person's body may be "highly intrusive" and
holding that random, suspicionless dog sniffs of a student was unreasonable
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any privacy interests students have in personal belongings
brought to school "are wholly obliterated" by suspicionless
searches of students' bags and purses. This is because such
searches can be done "at any time without notice,
individuahzed suspicion, or any apparent limit to the
extensiveness ofthe search."'^^
Therefore, if school officials conduct suspicionless searches
of students' belongings from the general student body, school
officials must have more than "generalized concerns about the
existence of weapons and drugs in [their] schools."'^^ Rather,
school officials must have particularized evidence to "shore up"
their assertions of a special need to conduct those searches.'^^
IL A NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH
PRACTICES
Keeping students safe and drug-free is a very important
goal and, to be sure, a high priority for all school officials. As
school officials are under pressure to tangibly demonstrate that
they are taking measures to reduce school crime and maintain
without particularized evidence of a drug problem in the school), and Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
sniffing of students by drug-detecting dogs constituted searches under the Fourth
Amendment and were unreasonable in light of no individualized suspicion), cert,
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983), and Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist, 499 F. Supp.
223, 235 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that random, suspicionless dog sniffs on
general student population were unconstitutional searches under the Fourth
Amendment), and Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993)
(holding that dog sniffs on persons required probable cause that the search of a
would produce contraband rather than reasonable suspicion).
156. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 355.
157. Id. at 356; see also B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1268
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that because "the record here does not disclose that there
was any drug crisis or even a drug problem at Quincy High," the suspicionless
searches of students were not justified under the Fourth Amendment); Hough v.
Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Minn. 2009) (concluding that
intrusive suspicionless searches through students' belongings for the purpose of
removing distractions and dangerous items was unconstitutional); cf Gardner,
supra note 10, at 941 ("The cases departing from the individualized suspicion
requirement share certain common features. In each instance, the courts perceive
the unparticularized search to be minimally intrusive and necessary to achieve
important governmental interests.").
158. Little Rock, 380 F.3d at 356. Some scholars have gone even further,
arguing that "[s]earches of a student's person or belongings such as backpacks or
purses require reasonable suspicion of a violation of a crime or school rules, and
such searches probably also require individualized suspicion." CATHERINE Y. KiM,
DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE:
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM i i 5 (2010).
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discipline and order, it is no surprise that they have resorted to
strict security measures.'^^ But absent extenuating
circumstances, there are sound educational policy reasons for
limiting the authority of school officials to conduct random,
suspicionless searches of students' belongings. This section first
discusses the negative consequences of relying on strict
security measures to prevent school crime. Next, it discusses
the particularly harmful consequences of disproportionately
applying strict security measures to minority students.
A. Strict Security Measures Are Inconsistent with
Students' Best Interests
Educational scholars, sociologists, and psychologists agree
that strict security measures have several harmful effects on
students. For example, aside from the obvious drawbacks of
creating distractions and taking away instructional time,
implementing strict security measures deteriorates the
learning environment by alienating students and generating
mistrust. Establishing trust between educators and students is
vital for creating a healthy climate conducive to learning.'^^
Yet, according to Paul Hirschfield, implementing strict security
measures sends a negative message to students that educators
are suspicious of students, which "sour[s] students' attitudes
toward school and school authorities and undermin[es] a
positive, respectful academic environment."'^' Indeed, strict
security measures produce formidable barriers between
students and their schools and are "a frequent cause of disunity
159. See Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction to SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 2-3 (Torin
Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2010) (reporting that even though school
violence is in decline, "the threat of 'another Columbine' (or Virginia Tech, and so
on) haunts the social imaginary, leading parents, policy makers, and others to the
sober conclusion that any security measure is worth whatever trade-offs are
involved in order to ensure safety).
160. See Roger D. Goddard, Megan Tschannen-Moran &• Wayne K. Hoy, A
Multilevel Examination of the Distribution and Effects of Teacher Trust in
Students and Parents in Urban Elementary Schools, 102 THE ELEMENTARY SCH.
J. 3, 3-4 (2001) (explaining that trusting in others is an important element to the
learning process); Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multidisciplinary
Analysis of the Nature, Meaning, and Measurement of Trust, 70 REV. OF EDUC.
RES. 547, 547 (2000) (same).
161. Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in America, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 38, 46 (Torin
Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2010). •
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or discord within the school community."'^^ Martin Gardner
explains, "In a very real sense, each and every student stands
accused, has become a *suspect,' in generalized school searches,
especially given the special relationship of trust which
supposedly exists between student and teacher."'^^ Gardner
posits that searches that take place in schools are much
different than searches in other environments, such as
airports. He reasons:
Surely a student even indirectly accused by his teacher as a
possible thief or drug user suffers a greater indignity and
loss of self-esteem by being subjected to a generalized
search than does an airline passenger passing through a
metal detector or a driver [through] a checkpoint. Far from
'morally neutral,' school searches are instead particularly
rife with moral overtones. ^ ^^
Jen Weiss reports that after interviewing students subject
to such security measures, she found that these measures
caused students to "feel consistently watched [and] to distrust,
hide from, and avoid authority figures." ^ ^^  She concludes that
instead of feeling a greater sense of safety at school, students
felt disillusioned and scared.'^^ She reports that "[sjtudents in
these schools experience, firsthand, what it is to be monitored,
contained, and harassed, all in the name of safety and
protection."'^' She further reports that such measures "caused
students to be less inclined to speak out or organize in response
to issues that bother them."'^s She maintains that strict
security measures are "counterproductive to safety[,] . . .
foment violence" in some cases, "negatively impact a school's
culture and reputation, and contribute to the loss of good
teachers and good students."'^^ Many leading scholars agree
with her conclusions. '^ ^
162. Id.
163. Gardner, supra note 10, at 943.
164. Id.
165. Jen Weiss, Scan This, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF
CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 213, 227 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres
eds., 2010).
166. Id. at 213.
167. Id.
168. / d at 227.
169. Id. at 213, 227.
170. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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In addition, strict security measures are part and parcel of
an overall exclusionary ethos designed to push low-performing
and disruptive students out of schools to make more resources
available to students who school officials believe have a better
chance to succeed.'^' Under zero-tolerance policies, when
school officials discover students carrying contraband, students
are suspended, expelled, and sometimes arrested.'^^ The result
is that many students spend more time away from school or are
funneled into the juvenile justice system.'^^ Scholars Catherine
Kim, Daniel Losen, and Damon Hewitt describe the
detrimental impact arrests and law enforcement referrals have
on students and on the public generally. They report:
[An arrest] nearly doubles the odds of dropping out of school
and, if coupled with a court appearance, nearly quadruples
the odds of dropout; lowers standardized-test scores;
reduces future employment prospects; and increases the
likelihood of future interaction with the criminal justice
system. These arrests and referrals also have a negative
impact on the larger community. Classmates who witness a
child being arrested for a minor infraction may develop
negative views or distrust of law enforcement. Juvenile-
court dockets and detention centers become crowded with
cases that could be handled more efficiently and more
effectively by school principals. And the community pays
the costs associated with an increase in dropouts, crime,
and unemployment, and, in extreme cases, the
incarceration of children. ^ '^^
This exclusionary ethos stands in stark contrast to an
inclusionary ethos, the aim of which is to grant low performing,
disruptive, or misguided students extra attention and
171. Hirschfield, supra note 161, at 45.
172. See, e.g.. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985) (using marijuana
found in school search to prosecute student); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 2004) (using marijuana found in search to
prosecute student); Hough v. Shakoppe Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093-96
(D. Minn. 2009) (using marijuana, a lighter, and weapons found in school search
to prosecute students); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 363 (using knife found in school
search to prosecute student in juvenile proceeding); see also KiM ET AL., supra
note 158, at 112 ("Evidence seized in the course of school searches and statements
made during school interrogations may be used against students in court
proceedings.").
173. KIM ETAL., supra note 158, at 112-13.
174. Id. at 113.
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resources to meet their needs. '^ ^
Strict security measures also skew students' mindsets
about constitutional values and the role of government in their
lives, causing students to discount important constitutional
rights. As Betsy Levin explains, schools play a critical role in
helping students learn skills and values that enable them to
exercise the responsibilities of citizenship and benefit from
participation in a free economy.'^^ Those values include the
right to privacy.'^^ If schools do not honor students'
constitutional rights, schools cannot effectively teach students
about those rights.'^^ This principle has been observed by the
175. See Hirschfield, supra note 161, at 45.
176. Levin, supra note 10, at 1648; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 373 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry.")-
177. Levin, supra note 10, at 1648.
178. Justice Brennan stated it this way: "Schools cannot expect their students
to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves
disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms."
Doe V. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); see also id. at 1027 ("We do not know what class petitioner
was attending when the police and dogs burst in [and sniffed her], but the lesson
the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater
impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey.") (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d 1100, 1108 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) ("It is hypocritical for a teacher to lecture on the grandeur of the
United States Constitution in the morning and violate its basic tenets in the
afternoon."); Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the
Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U . L. REV. 817, 833 (1992) ("Students learn about
the liberty, privacy, and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment more
through actions than words. Consequently, students are more likely to learn how
to resolve conflicts between personal liberty and public safety from witnessing
bookbag searches than from passively completing their reading assignments.");
Feld, supra note 10, at 953 ("Schools are the incubators of future citizens, and
school officials convey moral lessons by their actions. Providing young people with
real Fourth Amendment protection and meaningful enforcement mechanisms will
better socialize them to participate effectively in a democratic society as adults.");
Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Students: The Supreme Court's Latest Failure
to Articulate a "Sufficiently Clear" Statement of Fourth Amendment Law, 80 MiSS.
L.J. 955, 997 (2011) ("Teaching students to obey society's laws is surely a
fundamental aspect of their learning the meaning of good citizenship."); Roger
J.R. Levesque, The Right to Education in the United States: Beyond the Limits of
the Lore and Lure of Law, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 205, 247-48 (1997)
("Students do not benefit from learning that safety requires intrusive policing
under authoritarian and arbitrarily enforced rules."); Levin, supra note 10, at
1649 ("[I]f the educational institution is wholly undemocratic, students are likely
to get mixed signals with regard to the democratic values needed to function as
citizens in our society: The way in which school administrators operate schools
may have a more powerful influence on students than the lessons in their civics
textbooks."); Samantha Elizabeth Shutler, Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing of
High School Athletes, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1302-03 (1996) ("In
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Supreme Court as early as 1943 when it stated: "That [schools]
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."'^^ Furthermore, school officials' treatment of
students in schools socializes students to tolerate and expect
similar treatment by government officials outside of schools.'^'^
If students encounter drug sniffing dogs, metal detector checks,
frisks, and authorities rummaging through their personal
belongings on a regular basis, these practices will seem normal
to them.i^' The citizenry now may have divergent views
regarding individual privacy rights and the role the
government should play in our personal lives, but as the rising
generation becomes more accustomed to more intrusive
invasions, it is possible that those healthy debates may shift
towards greater acceptance of strict security measures or
disappear altogether.'^^
Finally, many studies cast doubt on whether strict security
measures effectively reduce school crime.'^^ Even strong
supporters of security measures readily concede that such
measures cannot prevent shootings or other acts of violence in
schools.'^ ** In fact, many researchers conclude that
implementing strict security measures increases student
behavioral issues and crime by alienating students instead of
forging a school climate based on collective responsibility and
mutual respect.'^^
order to preserve Constitutional reverence among a youth that is rapidly losing
respect for many of the traditional underpinnings of our society, courts must not
assist in eroding what little respect remains for the Constitution and the rights it
provides.").
179. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
180. KUPCHIK, siipra note 16, at 7.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
184. See NAT'L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERV., Metal Detectors and School Safety,
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/school_metal_detectors.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2012) ("There is no single strategy, or for that matter even a combination
of strategies, that can provide 100% guarantee that there will not be a shooting or
other act of violence at a school. School officials must therefore exercise caution to
avoid overreaction, knee-jerk reactions and/or the temptation to throw up security
equipment after a high-profile incident primarily for the purpose of appeasing
parents and relieving parental, community and media pressures. Doing so may
very well create a false sense of security that will backfire on school officials in the
long haul.").
185. See KUPCHIK, supra note 16, at 15-18 (2011) (explaining that student
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Rather than resorting to coercive methods that rely on
punishment and fear, there are more effective measures to
reduce school violence and drug abuse. ^ ^^  These methods
include counseling, mentoring, and programs that help
students become integrated in their neighborhoods and
communities.'^^ They also include mental health services;
after-school programs; and programs that develop character,
conflict resolution skills, and anger management. ' ^ ^ For
example, School-wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and
Supports is a well-respected, data-driven program that defines,
teaches and supports appropriate behavior to create strong
learning environments for an entire district or school.'^^ Its
misbehavior is likely to increase rather than decrease when students perceive
they are treated with disrespect and unfairly); Anderson, supra note 19, at 343-46
(finding that coercive forms of punishment are less effective than humanistic
forms of punishment); Beger, supra note 16, at 340 (citing several studies
demonstrating that "aggressive security measures produce alienation and
mistrust among students"); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 56 (providing evidence
that strict security measures alienates students); Edwards, supra note 18, at 250
("[I]ntrusive strategies are likely to undermine the trust needed to build
cooperative school communities capable of really preventing violence."); Mayer &
Leone, supra note 18, at 352 (finding that student disorder and victimization were
higher in schools using strict security measures than in schools that did not use
such measures); Noguera, supra note 16, at 190-91 (1995) (arguing that a "get
tough" approach does not create a safe environment because coercive measures
creates mistrust and resistance among the student body).
186. See Noguera, supra note 16, at 206; see also DANIEL J. LOSEN &
JONATHAN GJLLESPIE, CTR. FOR CiV. RIGHTS REMEDIES AT THE CiV. RIGHTS
PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY
EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 43-45 (Aug. 2012), http://civiirightsproject.
ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-ci vil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/
federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportunity-suspended-ccrr
-20l2.pdf (describing several practices for improving student behavior and
reducing student crime in schools that do not rely on coercion, punishment, or
fear).
187. See Amanda Paulson, Why School Violence Is Declining, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/
1206/pOlsOl-ussc.html (describing alternative methods schools have employed to
decrease crime such as involving community members to develop students'
character and ability to manage anger); Brian Wallace, School Crime Declines
Here, LANCASTER ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://lancasteronline.com/
articleAocal/605005_School-crime-declines-here.html (reporting that school
violence declined because of programs that help students improve their behavior,
develop conflict resolution skills, and improve their ability to have positive social
interactions among all students).
188. Paulson, supra note 187; see also LOSEN & GiLLESPlE, supra note 186, at
43-45.
189. See OSEP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER ON POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS EFFECTIVE SCHOOL-WIDE INTERVENTIONS, School-
wide PBIS, http://www.pbis.org/school/default.aspx (last visited on Oct. 4, 2012)
(describing school-wide PBIS); see also LOSEN & CiLLESPIE, supra note 186, at 43.
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major components include identifying expected behaviors;
teaching, modeling, and practicing those behaviors with
students; praising appropriate behavior publicly and privately;
and having clear consequences for targeted behavior.'^^ This
program has successfully improved behavior and reduced crime
in all settings, including urban schools and in the juvenile
justice system. ^ 1^ Other alternative measures include
restorative justice programs.'^^ The central concept of
restorative justice programs is to help the offender repair the
harm caused to victims and make communities whole.'^ -^
Restorative justice programs "place responsibility on students
themselves, using a collaborative response to wrongdoing."'^^
Researchers maintain that these programs foster in students "a
strong sense of community as well as a strong sense of
safety." 1^5 Schools that have implemented these alternative
programs can attest to their effectiveness.'^^ For example.
West Philadelphia High School, one of Pennsylvania's most
dangerous schools, reported that the number of violent
incidents decreased by 52 percent the year after implementing
its restorative justice program.'^^ The next year the number of
violent incidents decreased again by 45 percent.'^^ As Pedro
Noguera explains, in schools that have effectively addressed
student crime and violence, there "is a strong sense of
community and collective responsibility. Such schools are seen
by students as sacred territory, too special to be spoiled by
crime and violence, and too important to risk one's being
excluded."'5^ The existence of these schools provides tangible
evidence that there are more effective alternatives to combat
190. OSEP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER ON POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS EFFECTIVE SCHOOL-WIDE INTERVENTIONS, supra
note 189.
191. See OSEP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER ON POSITIVE BEHAVIORAL
INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS EFFECTIVE SCHOOL-WlDE INTERVENTIONS,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pbis.org/school/prim£iry_level/faqs.aspx
(last visited on Oct. 4, 2012).
192. See LOSEN & GiLLESPIE, supra note 186, at 44-45.
193. Id.
194. See Laura Mirsky, SaferSanerSchools: Transforming School Culture with
Restorative Practices, RESTORATIVE PRACTICES E-FORUM 1 (May 20, 2003),
http://www.iirp.edu/iirpWebsites/web/uploads/article_pdfs/ssspilots.pdf.
195. Id.
196. See generally id. See also LOSEN & GiLLESPIE, supra note 186, at 44-45.
197. Laura Mirsky, Building Safer, Saner Schools, 69 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 45,
49(2011).
198. Id.
199. Noguera, supra note 16, at 207.
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violence and drugs than employing intrusive security
measures. 2^ ^
B. Strict Security Measures Disproportionately Applied to
Minority Students Are Particularly Harmful
Empirical studies measuring the use of strict security
measures in schools are scarce.^0' The few studies that exist
suggest that strict security measures are apphed
disproportionately to schools with high minority populations.
For example, in another empirical study, I found that schools
with higher percentages of minority students were more likely
to use certain comhinations of strict security measures than
other schools, even after taking into account school crime,
neighhorhood crime, and school disorder. ^ ^^  Similarly, Aaron
Kupchik and Geoff Ward found that, after controlling for school
crime, neighhorhood crime, and school disorder, schools with
larger proportions of minority students were more likely to use
metal detectors than other schools, ^ o^  The findings from these
empirical studies are consistent with many ethnographers'
experiences that directly observe schools. ^ ^^  For example, Torin
Monahan and Rodolfo D. Torres explain:
Perhaps not surprisingly, racial minorities are
disproportionately subjected to contemporary surveillance
and policing apparatuses . . . . [That is,] students in poorer
inner-city schools are subjected to more invasive hand
searches and metal-detector screenings, while students in
more affluent schools tend to be monitored more discreetly
with video surveillance cameras. ^ ^^
200. Id.
201. See KUPCHIK &. WARD, supra note 29, at 4.
202. See Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race 27-32 (2013)
{unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.coni/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2214202 {finding that the odds of using a combination of strict
security measures that included metal detectors, surveillance cameras, random
sweeps, locked gates, and law enforcement officers were greater in schools serving
higher percentages of minority students than in other schools, even after taking
into account school crime, neighborhood crime, and school disorder).
203. KUPCHIK & WARD, supra note 29, at 20-26; see also Hirschfield, supra
note 161, at 40 (citing data that "urban schools composed largely of minority
students made up 14 percent of the nation's middle and high schools yet represent
75 percent of the surveyed middle and high schools . . . that scan their students
with metal detectors daily").
204. KUPCHIK & W . ^ D , supra note 29, at 4, 20-26.
205. Monahan & Torres, supra note 159, at 2.
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The disproportionate use of strict security measures to
minority students is particularly harmful for at least two
reasons. First, researchers observe that there already exist
high levels of mistrust between minority students and
educators.206 Thus, strict security measures, especially those
that appear to be applied unfairly, may negatively impact the
educational environment at schools with high minority
populations in a particularly severe manner.
Second, several leading social scientists and criminologists
are concerned that the presence of strict security in minority
schools perpetuates racial inequalities. ^ ^^  Loic Wacquant
argues that poor inner-city schools have "deteriorated to the
point where they operate in the manner of institutions of
confinement whose primary mission is not to educate but to
ensure 'custody and control, "'^ o^ As a result of this "custody and
control" approach to education, low-income minorities often
have very different educational experiences than affluent,
white students.209 For example, Aaron Kupchik and Geoff
Ward argue that strict security measures sour minorities'
attitudes towards the government and limit their future
opportunities. 2'0 They write:
206. See, e.g., Julia Bryan, Fostering Educational Resilience and Achievement
in Urban Schools Through School-Family Community Partnerships, 8 PROF. SCH.
COUNSELING 219, 222 (2005) ("Positive relationships between schools and families
in many urban schools are infrequent because parents often do not trust the
schools and school professionals in turn do not trust minority and low-income
families and communities."); Constance Flanagan et al.. School and Community
Climates and Civic Commitments: Patterns of Ethnic Minority and Majority
Students, 99 J. OF EDUC. PSYCHOL. 421, 423 (2007) (studies have shown that
minority groups have reported "a lower sense of school belonging than . . . their
European American peers."); Noguera, supra note 16, at 201 (describing the
sentiment in many black communities that black children are being treated
unfairly in schools); Susan Rosenbloom & Niobe Way, Experiences of
Discrimination among African American, Asian American, and Latino Adolescents
in an Urban High School, 35 YOUTH & SOC. 420, 434 (2004) ("When African
American and Latino students were asked about their experiences with
discrimination, they described hostile relationships with adults in positions of
authority such as . . . teachers in school").
207. See KUPCHIK & WARD, supra note 29, at 3-10 (describing the negative
effects of implementing strict security measures to minority students); see also
Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, in
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 189-90 (David
Garland ed., 2001).
208. Wacquant, supra note 207, at 189-90.
209. See KUPCHIK & WARD, supra note 29, at 6-7.
210. Id. at 6.
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Marginalized youth are presumed to be young criminals
and treated as such through exposure to criminal justice
oriented practices (e.g., police surveillance and metal
detectors), while youth with social, political and cultural
capital are presumed to be well-behaved, treated as such,
and empowered to be productive citizens. Furthermore, this
disparity in school security can have profound consequences
on students' social mobility, since suspension, expulsion and
arrest each limit their future educational and employment
prospects.^ ^ '
Similarly, Paul Hirschfield argues that the resulting
disproportionate use of strict security measures prepares urban
minority students for certain positions in the postindustrial
order, "whether as prisoners, soldiers, or service sector
workers."^'^ While conceding that the purpose of these
measures may be laudable—to prevent contraband from
entering schools—strict security measures stand as a "daily
reminder of how little power students have over those in whom
they entrust their futures and, in turn, how powerless their
trusted guardians are to secure for the students a dignified,
timely, and safe passage into school (and adulthood)."^'^
IIL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT SOME SCHOOLS MAY
BE CONDUCTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES
The objective of this Article's empirical study was to
identify the number of schools potentially performing
unconstitutional searches of students' belongings and the
demographics of those schools. First, this section describes the
2009-2010 and 2007-2008 SSOCS datasets used for the
empirical analysis, including how schools were selected to
participate in the study and the types of questions the survey
asked.^'"* Next, it provides a brief national snapshot of the
types of searches schools perform.^i5 Then, it provides a
detailed analysis of the particular search practice of interest
here, namely, searches of students' belongings.^'ö in short, it
211. Id. at!.
212. See Hirschfield, supra note 161, at 40.
213. Id. at 51.
214. See infra Sections III.A-B.
215. See infra Section III.C.
216. See infra Sections III.C-D.
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determines that, although additional research is needed to
draw clearer conclusions, the results of this analysis raise
concerns that some schools may be violating students' civil
rights by conducting suspicionless searches on students'
belongings without having particularized evidence of a
substance abuse or weapons problem.^ '^^  Finally, it reports the
demographics of schools that are performing those potentially
unconstitutional searches.^^^ The results of a binary logistic
regression demonstrate that schools with higher minority
populations are more likely to conduct these suspicionless
searches than schools with lower minority populations.^^^
These findings hold true even when taking into account school
officials' perceptions of crime levels where students live and
where the school is located. 220
A. Data and Sample
Data for this study came from two restricted-use datasets:
the SSOCS for the 2007-2008 school year and the SSOCS for
the 2009-2010 school year. These are the two most recent
databases available to researchers.221 Both datasets were
published by the U.S. Department of Education's National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES).222
1. The SSOCS 2009-2010 Dataset
The data from the SSOCS 2009-2010 restricted-use
dataset became available to researchers that met certain
conditions in June 2011.223 NOES used the 2007-2008 school
217. See infra Section IILD.
218. See infra Section III.E.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Although the restricted datasets are not available to the general public,
see supra note 21, datasets that contain less sensitive data for the 2007-2008
school year are available for the general public. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
Data Products, http;//nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
222. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., About Us, http://nces.ed.gov/about/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (The NCES "is the primary federal entity for collecting and
analyzing data related to education in the United States and other nations.").
223. NCES defines "restricted-access" data as data that contains "individually
identifiable information that are confidential and protected by law. This
information is not publicly released." See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., Statistical
Standard Program, http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp Gast
visited Mar. 7, 2012).
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year Common Core of Data Public Elementary/Secondary
School Universe File (CCD)224—the most complete list of public
schools available—as a sampling frame^^^ to generate schools
to participate in the study. 2^6 After the sample frame was
stratified, or subdivided into subsets to ensure that subgroups
of interest would be adequately represented, 227 schools were
randomly selected to participate in the study. 228 Of the
approximately 3,480 public schools that were selected to
participate, 229 approximately 2,650 public schools submitted
usable questionnaires for a response rate of about 76
percent.230 NCES collected the data from February 24, 2010 to
June 11, 2010.23J
224. The Common Core of Data "is an NCES annual census system that
collects fiscal and non-fiscal data on all public schools, public school districts, and
state education agencies in the United States." RUDDY ET AL., supra note 22, at 8;
see also Helen M. Marks & Jason P. Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under
Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal Influence on Instruction and
Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10-11 (2007) (describing the Common Core of
Data). The CCD includes regular schools, charter schools, and schools that have
magnet programs in the United States. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2009-2010
SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE
USER MANUAL 8 (2Q11) [hereinafter 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL] (on file
with author). It excludes schools in the U.S. outlying areas, such as American
Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, as well as overseas Department of Defense
schools, newly closed schools, home schools. Bureau of Indiana Education schools,
non-regular schools, ungraded schools, and schools with a high grade of
kindergarten or lower. Id.
225. A "sampling frame" is a hst of units that could be selected for study. See
RICHARD L. SCHEAFFER ETAL., ELEMENTARY SURVEY SAMPLING 43 (5th ed. 1996).
226. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 8.
227. See id. at 9-10. The sample was stratified by instructional level (e.g.,
elementary school, middle school, high school), locale (e.g., rural, suburban,
urban), enrollment size, and region (e.g.. Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).
Id. The sample frame was also stratified by percent of combined student
population as Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Native
Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Alaska Native. Id.
228. Id. at 10.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1, 9-13. A response rate of 76 percent is very good. See EARL
BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 256 (9th ed. 200i). A high response
rate reduces bias in the data. Id. NCES notes that some schools were more likely
than others to respond to the survey. For example, schools more likely to respond
included rural schools, schools with fewer students, combined schools, or those
with a low percent of combined BlackVAfrican American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian,
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, and American Indian/Alaska Native
students. 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 9-10. While no
category had a response rate lower than 69 percent, see id. at 13, using a sample
weight to analyze the data helped ameliorate the effects of discrepancies in the
response rates. See id. at 1.
231. 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at l.
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2. The SSOCS 2007-2008 Restricted-Use Dataset
The data from the SSOCS 2007-2008 restricted-use
dataset became available in June 2009 for researchers who met
certain conditions. 232 NCES used the 2005-2006 CCD233 as a
sampling frame234 to generate schools for the study.235 After
the sample frame was stratified,236 schools were randomly
selected to participate in the study.23'7 Of the 3,484 public
schools that were selected to participate in the study,238 2,560
public schools submitted usable questionnaires for a response
rate of just over 77 percent.239 NCES collected the data from
February 25, 2008 to June 17, 2008.2^0
B. Research Instrument
The 2009-2010 and 2007-2008 SSOCS datasets provided a
unique opportunity to view, on a national scale, the types of
searches school officials perform. In both the 2009-2010 and
2007-2008 surveys, school principals were asked a number of
questions relating to school security, the number of crime-
related incidents occurring on school grounds, and school
demographics.2^*1 For example, principals were asked if it was a
practice in the principal's school to:
232. For a description of what constitutes "restricted-use" data, see supra note
21 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 224 and accompanying text for a description of the CCD.
234. See supra note 225 for a definition of the term "sampling frame."
235. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2007-2008 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME
AND SAFETY (SSOCS): SURVEY DOCUMENTATION FOR RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE
USERS 8 (2009) [hereinafter 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL] (on file with
author).
236. See id. at 9. The sample was stratified by instructional level, locale,
enrollment size, region, and student race. Id. at 9-11; see also supra note 223 and
accompanying text.
237. 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 10.
238. M ; see also 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 9.
239. Id. at 1, 9-11. A response rate of 77 percent is very good and reduced bias
in the data. See BABBIE, supra note 230, at 256. Similar to the 2009-2010 SSOCS,
some categories of schools were more likely than others to respond to the survey.
Id. No category had a response rate lower than 67 percent, and using a sample
weight helped ameliorate the effects of the discrepancies in the response rates. Id.
at 11. See also infra note 222 and accompanying text.
240. 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 1.
241. See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25; 2007-2008 SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25.
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• Require students to pass through metal detectors each
day;
• Perform one or more random metal detector checks on
students;
• Use one or more random dog sniffs to check for drugs;
• Require drug tests for athletes;
• Require drug testing for students in extracurricular
activities other than athletics;
• Require drug testing for any other students; and
• Perform one or more random sweeps for contraband
(e.g., drugs or weapons), but not including dog
' sniffs.242
In addition, school principals were asked to report the
number of incidents that occurred at school during the
school year relating to:
• Robbery with a weapon;
• Physical attack or fight with a weapon;
• Threats of physical attack or fight with a weapon;
• Possession of a firearm or explosive device;
• Possession of a knife or sharp object;
• Distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs;
• Inappropriate distribution, possession, or use of
prescription drugs; and
• Distribution, possession, or use of alcohol.^ "*^
C. Overall Descriptive Data
Table 1 presents the descriptive data for secondary schools'
search practices in both the 2009-2010 and 2007-2008 school
years. It includes estimates of how many schools nationwide
performed random metal detector checks, used random dog
sniffs to checks for drugs, ^^ 4 required students to undergo drug
242. 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5; 2007-2008
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5. Each answer required a yes or no
answer. Id.
243. 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 11; 2007-2008
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25. Unlike the 2009-2010 SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE, the 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE did not ask principals to
report the number of incidents relating to the "inappropriate distribution,
possession, or use of prescription drugs." See id.
244. Some courts have concluded that dog sniffs on items such as backpacks
and purses, as opposed to the students themselves, are not considered searches
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testing, required students to pass through metal detectors each
day, and performed random sweeps for contraband. It presents
the raw sample numbers and percentages, 245 as well as the
population estimates based on a sample weight provided by the
NCES.246
TABLE 1: Descriptive Data for Search Practices in
Public Secondary Schools in 2009-2010 and 2007-2008247
Search Practice
Required students to pass through metal
detectors each day.
Performed one or more random metal
detector checks on students.
Used one or more random dog sniffs to
check for drugs.
Performed one or more random sweeps
for contraband (e.g., drugs or weapons),
hut not including dog sniffs.
Required drug testing for athletes.
Required drug testing for students in
extra-curricular activities other than
athletics.
Required drug testing for any other
students.
2009-2010
60 (3.0%)
1060 (3.1%)
210 (10.7%)
3340 (9.9%)
1020 (52.0%)
16,979 (50.2%)
450 (23.0%)
8204 (24.2%)
250 (12.8%)
4325 (12.8%)
170 (8.7%)
3215 (9.5%)
140 (7.1%)
2261 (6.7%)
2007-2008
60 (3.1%)
855 (2.5%)
220 (11.3%)
3313 (9.8%)
970 (50.0%)
16,043 (47.4%)
460 (23.7%)
7843 (23.2%)
240 (12.5%)
4444 (13.1%)
150 (7.7%)
2978 (8.8%)
120 (6.2%)
2153 (6.4%)
The descriptive data show that use of strict security
under the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 148.
245. Pursuant to the guidelines for presenting results from the restricted-use
databases, I rounded sample numbers to the nearest ten. U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC,
RESTRICTED-USE DATA PROCEDURES MANUAL 20 (20ii), http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs96/96860rev.pdf.
246. Sample weights compensate for unequal probabilities of selection,
minimizes bias associated with responding and non-responding schools, reduces
sampling error, and calibrates the data to known population characteristics to
produce optimal national estimates. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL,
supra note 224, at 13; 2007-2008 RESTRICTED USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 13
(describing the specific weighting procedures employed); see also U.N. Group of
Experts Meeting to Review the Draft Handbook on Designing of Household
Sample Surveys, Dec. 3, 2003-Dec. 5, 2003, U.N. Doc. ESAySTAT/AC.91/5, at 5-3
(Nov. 3, 2003) (prepared by Ibrahim S. Yansaneh), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/meetings/egm/Sainpling_1203/ docs/no_5.pdf..
247. N = 1960 for the 2009-^2010 SSOCS; N=1940 for the 2007-2008 SSOCS.
The results are reported as raw numbers (rounded to the nearest ten);
percentages are in parentheses; weighted results are reported in bold. Weighted
results provide an estimate of the total number of schools in the United States
that have Usted the search practice.
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measures in secondary schools is not uncommon. During the
2009-2010 school year, over 10 percent of public secondary
schools performed one or more random metal detector checks
on students; approximately 52 percent used one or more
random dog sniffs to check for drugs; and many schools
required drug testing for either athletes, students in
extracurricular activities, or any other students.^"^8 There were
only shght changes in the number of schools conducting these
searches from 2007-2008 to 2009-2010.249
Important for the purposes of this study, approximately 23
percent of secondary schools in both school years performed
"one or more random sweeps for contraband (e.g., drugs or
weapons), but not including dog sniffs."250 it is not entirely
clear how school officials interpreted this question, and NCES
should consider revising this question in future questionnaires
to avoid ambiguity.251 School officials could have interpreted
"random sweeps for contraband" to mean searches through
students' belongings, especially because this is the only method
school administrators have to search for drugs without using
drug sniffing dogs.252 Indeed, the number of cases reporting
that school officials routinely search through students'
belongings demonstrate that this search practice is not at all
uncommon.253
248. See supra Table 1.
249. SeesupraTahle 1.
250. See supra Table 1.
251. See infra Section IV.C.
252. See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5; 2007-2008
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5. While it is possible that some of
these principals may have reported that their schools performed "random sweeps
for contraband" when only scanning students' personal belongings using a hand
wand, that assumption is undermined by the fact that a separate question already
exists addressing whether school officials "perform[ed] one or more random metal
detector checks on students." 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25,
at 5; 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5.
253. See, e.g.. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist, 380 F.3d 349, 351-53
(8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that school officials had a practice of selecting a
classroom at will, ordering students to remove everything from their pockets and
place their backpacks and purses on the desks in front of them, marching them
out into the hallway, scanning students' bodies with metal detectors to ensure
that nothing metal was leaving the classroom, and searching through by hand
students' belongings left behind); Hough v. Shakoppe Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1103-04 (D. Mian. 2009) (explaining that school had a daily search practice
of asking students to remove their shoes and socks, turn down the waistband of
their pants, empty their pockets, turn over their backpacks and purses to be
searched, and sometimes submit to a pat down); Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179-80 (D.N.M. 2011) (describing search tactics at the
entrance of a prom where a security officer touched female students' arms and
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Alternatively, school officials could have interpreted
"random sweeps for contraband" to imply random locker
searches. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court declined to address
whether students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their lockers, ^ ^^  and there is no consensus among lower federal
and state courts regarding this issue. ^ ^^  Nevertheless, as many
courts have recognized, there is no logical legal rationale
supporting the assertion that students should lose their
expectation of privacy in their personal belongings simply
because they place them in their lockers. ^ 56 Thus, potential
stomachs; cupped and shook students' breasts; lifted their dresses to mid-thigh
level and touched legs; took their shoes, shook them, and hit them on the table;
passed a wand around students; then dumped the contents of their purses on a
table to look for contraband); In re Wilson P., No. B196854, 2008 WL 521149 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2008) (explaining that school official searched through students'
pant pockets stored in a gym locker); In re Joshua E., No. B171643, 2004 WL
2914984 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2004) (describing that school official conducted
random, suspicionless searches of students and their belongings in three
designated classrooms); In re T.A.S., 713 S.E.2d 211, 212 (N.C. App. Ct. 2011)
(describing that to enter school, "students must pass through a metal detector, at
which time their book bags, purses, and coats are also searched); In re F.B., 726
A.2d 361, 368 (Pa. 1999) (describing school district's practice of conducting
random, suspicionless search of a student's belongings).
254. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 n.5 (1985) ("We do not
address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property
provided for the storage of school supplies.").
255. For example, many courts have affirmatively held that students retain an
expectation of privacy in their lockers. See, e.g.. State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142,
146 (Iowa 2003) (holding that students have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their school lockers); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass.
1992) (same); S.C. v. State, 583 So. 2d 188, 191 (Miss. 1991) (same);
Commonwealth v. Cass, 666 A.2d 313, 315-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (same); State
V. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728, 736-37 (W. Va. 1985) (same); But other courts have
held that students have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers. See
In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405, 408 (Md. 2000) (holding that student had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in locker in light of state statute stating that
lockers are school property); In re Isaiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 667-68 (Wis. 1993)
(same). For a more extended discussion on the disagreement among courts
regarding whether students possess an expectation of privacy in their lockers, see
Feld, supra note 10, at 933-37; KiMETAL., supra note 158, at 115-17.
256. See In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d 1100, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (explaining
that "a student does not lose his expectation of privacy in a coat or book bag
merely because the student places these objects in his locker"); Cass, 666 A.2d at
317 (stating that "a student's expectation of privacy in a jacket or purse was not
lost merely because the student placed the jacket or purse in his or her locker.");
In re Dumas, 505 A.2d 984, 985-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (applying the reasoning
of T.L.O. and refusing to uphold search of a student's jacket inside of his locker
because the student retained a reasonable expectation of privacy within his
jacket, stating, "We are unable to conclude that a student would have an
expectation of privacy in a purse or jacket which the student takes to school but
would lose that expectation of privacy merely by placing the purse or jacket in [a]
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locker searches that include searching through students'
personal belongings stored inside a locker such as book bags,
purses, jackets, folders, or gym bags, arguably also should be
deemed as highly intrusive. While more research is needed to
precisely measure how many schools are searching through
students' belongings, either through more carefully crafted
questionnaires or through personal observations, these
preliminary results suggest that many schools could be
performing these intrusive searches, which, as explained
above, are justified only under appropriate circumstances. ^ 57
D. Random Sweeps for Contraband Disaggregated by
Particularized Evidence of a Substance Abuse or
Weapons Problem
Random, suspicionless searches of students' personal
belongings are considered to be highly intrusive and are
justified under the Fourth Amendment only when certain
conditions are present. ^ 58 Under the current legal framework,
school officials must have particularized evidence of a
substance abuse or weapons problem in their schools to justify
conducting these searches, unless a school official reasonably
believes that students are in immediate danger.^^^
In both the 2009-2010 and 2007-2008 SSOCS, principals
were asked to report the total number of incidents that
occurred at school during the school year relating to robbery
with a weapon; physical attack or fight with a weapon; threats
of physical attack or fight with a weapon; possession of a
firearm or explosive device; possession of a knife or sharp
object; distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs;
inappropriate distribution, possession, or use of prescription
drugs; and distribution, possession, or use of alcohol. ^ ^^  The
school locker provided to the student for storage of personal items"); c.f MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 121A.72 (West 2008) ("The personal possessions of students within a
school locker may be searched only when school authorities have a reasonable
suspicion that the search will, uncover evidence of a violation of law or school
rules."); see also KIM ET AL., supra note 158, at 116 ("[E] ven in jurisdictions where
students are held to have no privacy interest in lockers, it does not follow that
items stores inside lockers, such as book bags and coats, may automatically be
searched just because the locker itself is subject to search.").
257. See supra Section I.E.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 11; 2007-2008
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5. Unlike the 2009-2010 SSOCS
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number of incidents relating to students' use or possession of
weapons, alcohol, or drugs is an indicator of the ability of
school officials to provide particularized evidence of a drug,
alcohol, or weapons problem in their schools.
Of course, the number of incidents relating to students' use
or possession of weapons, alcohol, or drugs is by no means a
perfect indicator for at least three reasons. First, although
school officials are assured that their individual answers for
the SSOCS will not be publicly disclosed,^61 it is possible that
some school officials may have underreported the number of
incidents relating to drugs, alcohol, and weapons. This may be
because they do not have an accurate reporting system262 or
because it may be advantageous to underreport those incidents
pursuant to certain state or federal reporting requirements.^^^
Second, the reported number of incidents relating to drugs,
alcohol, or weapons does not take into account other
observations that possibly could be used by school officials to
establish a drug or weapons problem such as observing a
marijuana cigarette or a beer can in the school parking lot or
overhearing students talk about drug use.264 Third, principals
were asked to report the total number of incidents that
occurred at school during the school year, not prior years.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue,
school officials possibly could establish an immediate need to
conduct these searches based on a substance abuse or weapons
problem during prior school years.
On the other hand, this data may overestimate the ability
QUESTIONNAIRE, the 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE did not ask principals to
report the number of incidents relating to the "inappropriate distribution,
possession, or use of prescription drugs." See id.
261. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2007-2008 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME
AND SAFETY (SSOCS): SURVEY DOCUMENTATION FOR PUBLIC-USE DATA FILE
USERS B-2 (2O1O) (assuring principals that their answers are "protected under the
Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002," meaning that the answers "may only be
used for statistical purposes and may not be disclosed, or used, in identifiable
form for any other purpose, except as provided for in the Patriot Act").
262. See SNELL, supra note 2, at 24 (describing some school districts' problems
with data collection); see also NAT'L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERV., School Crime
Reporting and School Crime Underreporting, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends
/school_crime_reporting.html (last visited on Sept. 28, 2012).
263. See SNELL, supra note 2, at 22—23 (describing the political complexities
schools and states face when reporting violent incidents pursuant to No Child Left
Behind); see also NAT'L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERV., School Crime Reporting and
School Crime Underreporting, supra note 262 (arguing that school administrators
underreport school crime for political or image purposes).
264. See Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 854-55 (2002).
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of school officials to establish a substance abuse or weapons
problem. My own analysis of the restricted SSOCS databases
shows that many incidents cited by principals relating to
drugs, alcohol, or weapons were not reported to the police,
indicating that perhaps some of these incidents were not
serious. For example, the restricted data from the 2009-2010
SSOCS show that 790 secondary schools in the sample reported
at least one incident relating to alcohol, but only 600 of those
schools reported at least one incident relating to alcohol to the
police. 2^ ^ Similarly, 680 secondary schools reported at least one
incident relating to the unauthorized use of prescription drugs,
but only 580 of those schools reported at least one incident
relating to the unauthorized use of prescription drugs to the
police. In another example, 1020 secondary schools in the
sample reported at least one incident relating to a knife or
sharp object, but only 830 of those schools reported at least one
incident relating to a knife or sharp object to the police. While
principals may not be reporting incidents to the police in order
to avoid adverse attention from the media or community or to
avoid involving students in the juvenile justice system, as
explained above, an alternative explanation is that some of
these incidents may not have been serious, such as the recovery
of a scout pocketknife, scissors, plastic butter knives, or
harmless over-the-counter medication. ^ 66 Less serious
incidents, of course, would make it more difficult for schools to
show that they have a substance abuse or weapons problem.^6?
Figure 1 presents data from 2009-2010 and 2007-2008
265. Pursuant to the guidelines for presenting results from the restricted-use
databases, raw numbers have been rounded to the nearest ten. U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC, RESTRICTED-USE DATA PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 245, at 20.
266. See Mary Nash-Wood, Are School Zero-Tolerance Policies Too Harsh? USA
TODAY (Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/
story/2011-12-04/zero-tolerance-policy/51632100/l (reporting that a student was
severely disciplined for giving her friend a single Midol pill); Zero Tolerance:
States 'Add a Little Common Sense', EDUC. REP., June 2009, available at
http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2OO9/juneO9/2ero-tolerance-states.html
(reporting that a student was arrested for bringing a plastic butter knife to
school); id. (reporting that an honors student was punished for a small cutting
implement used to sharpen her pencil).
267. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63 (determining
that Vernonia's concern was immediate in light of the "large segment of the
student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a
state of rebellion," that disciplinary actions had reached "epidemic proportions,"
and that "the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by
the students' misperceptions about the drug culture") (quoting Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ore. 1992)).
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regarding schools that conducted random sweeps for
contraband disaggregated by the number of reported incidents
relating to drugs, alcohol, or weapons. The table is divided into
six categories of schools that have conducted random sweeps
for contraband: those reporting no incidents relating to drugs,
alcohol, or weapons; one or fewer instances; two or fewer; three
or fewer; four or fewer; and five or fewer. I present the data in
this manner because it is not clear how much evidence schools
need to provide to demonstrate that they have a substance
abuse or weapons problem. For example, suppose the only
evidence schools can produce to substantiate a drug problem is
the recovery of one marijuana cigarette from one student. Or
suppose the only incident relating to alcohol is identifying one
student at a football game who had been drinking. Or what if
the only evidence of a weapons problem is the recovery of a
pocket knife? Such particularized evidence may not be
sufficient to establish an immediate n,eed to conduct
suspicionless searches of students' belongings.^^s
Figure 1: Schools in Sample
"Random Sweeps for Contraband" Disaggregated by
Number of Incidents Relating to Drugs, Alcohol, or
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Figure 1 demonstrates that approximately seventy schools
in the 2009-2010 sample and approximately sixty schools in
the 2007-2008 sample conducted random sweeps for
contraband without reporting any incidents relating to drugs.
268. See supra note 267.
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alcohol, or weapons during the school year. That number
climbs to ninety and one hundred, respectively, for schools that
reported one or fewer instances of drugs, alcohol, or weapons,
and to 120 and 150, respectively, for schools that reported two
or fewer incidents. The number of schools that may have
searched students' belongings or persons steadily increased as
schools reported more incidents, topping out at 210 and 240,
respectively, for schools that reported five or fewer instances of
drugs, alcohol, or weapons.
Figure 2: Estimate of Schools Nationally
"Random Sweeps for Contraband" Disaggregated by
Number of Incidents Relating to Drugs, Alcohol, or
ej3 Weapons
12007-08
12009-10
Number of Campus Incidents Involving Drugs, Alcohol, or
Weapons
Figure 2 provides an estimate of the number of schools
nationally that conducted random sweeps for contraband
disaggregated by the number of incidents involving drugs,
alcohol, or weapons.^^^ These findings raise concerns that some
schools may be conducting unconstitutional searches, - but
additional study is needed to draw clearer conclusions because
of the interpretative limitations of the data. As explained
above, researchers must not only craft better questions to
measure whether schools conduct searches on students'
belongings, but they must also seek to identify the conditions
269. Estimates were created from the sample weights provided by NCES.
2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 13; 2007-2008
RESTRICTED USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 13.
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under which schools conduct such searches. For example, it is
possible that school officials performed a random sweep in
response to a legitimate concern that caused school officials to
believe that students were in immediate danger, such as
receiving a bomb threat or information from a credible
informant that an unknown student had a dangerous
weapon.2'70 In addition, school officials could have performed
random sweeps to uncover stolen money or instruments used to
deface school property. Or, perhaps school officials conducted
these searches on a subset of the student population that had a
reduced expectation of privacy such as athletes or students
involved in extracurricular activities. ^ ^^  Under these
circumstances, it may have been appropriate for school officials
to conduct suspicionless searches on students' belongings even
where there had been no prior incidents relating to weapons,
drugs, or other contraband.^'^2 Nevertheless, despite these
ambiguities, these preliminary empirical results raise concerns
that some schools may be violating students' Fourth
Amendment rights, warranting further research on these
issues. Further, even if these searches are not unconstitutional,
the fact that many schools perform suspicionless searches
without reporting any incidents relating to weapons, drugs, or
alcohol raises serious pedagogical concerns. ^ 3^
270. See, e.g., Thompson ex rel. Lea v. Carthage Sch. Dist, 87 F.3d 979, 982-83
(8th Cir. 1996) (upholding school-wide search where a bus driver informed the
principal that there were "fresh cuts on seats of her bus"); Koontz ex rel. Sorenson
V. Dustin, No. 5:09-cv-147-Oc-10GRJ, 2010 WL 3788870, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
24, 2010) (holding that search of students' backpacks after rumor of a bomb inside
the school bus did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Brousseau ex rel.
Brousseau v. Town of Westerly ex rel. Perri, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.R.L 1998)
(upholding search of all students in cafeteria when a cafeteria worker informed a
school official that a 13'/4 inch-long knife was missing from the school cafeteria).
271. To be clear, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Fourth
Amendment permits school officials to conduct intrusive searches on athletes,
such as searching through their belongings in a gym bag. However, Vernonia and
Earls suggest that whether these searches are justified is a closer question than if
such searches were performed on students from the general student body. See
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831-32 (2002).
272. See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text.
273. See infra Section IV.
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E. Predictors for Schools That Conduct Random Sweeps
With No Particularized Evidence of a Substance Abuse
or Weapons Problem
The SSOCS data also provide insight regarding the
demographics of secondary schools that conduct random
sweeps without reporting any incidents relating to drugs,
alcohol, or weapons. To examine those demographics, I
conducted a binary logistic regression analysis^^"* where the
dependent variable was whether schools "perform [ed] one or
more random sweeps for contraband (e.g., drugs or weapons),
but not including dog sniffs."^^^ 'pj^ g independent variables
included factors that possibly influenced school officials to
conduct random sweeps, such as how principals perceived the
level of crime where their students lived, ^ ^^  how principals
perceived the level of crime where their school is located,^ '^ '? the
274. Binary logistic regression is a method for examining the relationship
between independent variables and a binary dependent variable. See THE
MEASUREMENT GRP., Logistic Regression, http://www.themeasurementgroup.com/
datamining/definitions/logistic_regression.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); see
generally JOSEPH F. HAIR, JR., ETAL., MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 276-81 (5th
ed. 1998) (providing an overview of logistic regression analysis). Logistic
regression is similar to linear regression except that the dependent variable is
binary and the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variables
is assessed by odds-ratios. See THE MEASUREMENT GRP., supra, see generally
Raymond E. Wright, Logistic Regression, in READING AND UNDERSTANDING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 217-44 (Laurence G. Grimm & Paul R. Yarnold eds.,
1995) (discussing the similarities between logistic regression and linear
regression). To make a stronger inference about the population from which the
sample was drawn, I used a sample weight for the logistic regression. See supra
note 235. I adjusted the sample weight created by NCES by dividing it by its
mean to create a mean weight of one. This is a recommended procedure when
employing logistic regression analysis using SPSS. See Marks & Nance, supra
note 224, at 14; Patty Glynn, Adjusting or Normalizing Weights "On the Fly" in
SPSS, U. OF WASH., http://staff.washington.edu/glynn/adjspss.pdf (last updated
July 8, 2004).
275. See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5; 2007-2008
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 5.
276. Principals were asked to "describe the crime level in the area(s) in which
your students live." See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 17;
2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 17. The possible responses
included "high level of crime," "moderate level of crime," "low level of crime," and
"[sjtudents come from areas with very different levels of crime." See 2009-2010
SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 17; 2007-20O8 SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 17. I merged these four categories into two
categories: "low level of crime" and "moderate, high, or mixed levels of crime." I
dummy-coded these variables, using "low level of crime" as the reference variable.
277. Principals were asked to "describe the crime level in the area where your
school is located." The possible responses included "high level of crime," "moderate
level of crime," and "low level of crime." See 2009-2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE,
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racial composition of the student population,2^8 school level,279
school enrollment size,280 school location,^^i region of the
country, 282 and the number of students eligible for free and
reduced student lunch. ^ 83 The independent variables also
included whether juvenile justice agencies were involved in the
school's efforts to promote school safety and drug-free
supra note 25, at 17; 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 17. I
merged these three categories into two categories: "low level of crime" and
"moderate or high level of crime." I dummy-coded "moderate or high level of
crime," using "low level of crime" as the reference variahle.
278. NCES categorized schools as having a white student population of more
than 95 percent, more than 80 to 95 percent, more than 50 to 80 percent, or 50
percent or less. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 29;
2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 43. Racial data for the
2009-2010 SSOCS came from the 2007-2008 CCD school data file. See 2009-2010
RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 29. Racial data for the 2007-2008
SSOCS came from the 2005-06 CCD school data file. See 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-
USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 43. Although there was a two-year difference, it
is highly unlikely that over that period a school would have shifted into a new
racial category. A major racial shift in the student population for a school over a
two-year period would require an extraordinary event such as a desegregation
court order. I dummy-coded these variahles, using "50 percent or less white
enrollment" as the reference variahle.
279. NCES categorized secondary schools as a middle school, high school, or
comhined school. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 28;
2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 46. I dummy-coded
these variahles, using "high school" as the reference group.
280. NCES categorized schools as having fewer than 300 students, between
300-499 students, between 500-999 students, or 1,000 or more students. See
2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 28; 2007-2008
RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 47. I dummy-coded these variahles,
using "less than 300 students" as the reference group.
281. NCES categorized schools as being located in a city, suhurb, town, or rural
area. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at 28-29; 2007-
2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 47. I dummy-coded these
variahles, using "rural" as the reference group.
282. NCES categorized schools as being located in a western, midwestern,
northeastern, or southern state. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra
note 224, at 25; 2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at 47. I
dummy-coded these variables, using "southern state" as a reference group.
283. Free and reduced lunch is a common proxy for student poverty. See, e.g.,
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., Concentration of Students Eligible for Free-or
Reduced-Price Lunch, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_pcp.asp (last
visited Oct. 12, 2012) ("The percentage of students eligible for the free or reduced-
price lunch (FRPL) program provides a proxy measure for the concentration of
low-income students within a school."). Here, the categories for this variable
include: 0 to 20 percent of the student population eligible for free or reduced
lunch; over 21 percent to 50 percent of the student population eligihle for free or
reduced lunch; and over 50 percent of the student population eligihle for free or
reduced lunch. See 2009-2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 224, at C-63;
2007-2008 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 235, at H-4. I dummy-coded
these variahles, using "over 50 percent" as the reference group.
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schools, 2^"* and if the school had a security guard, security
personnel, or law enforcement officer present at the school at
least once a week.285 I present the results of the binary logistic
regression in Table 2.
TABLE 2: Factors Predicting Whether Public Secondary
Schools Conducted "Random Sweeps for Contraband"286
Item
Percent of
minority
students" '
Between 0 - 5%
Between 5 - 20%
Between 20-50%
School
enrollment
size^««
Between 300-499
Between 500-999
Over 1000
School Level"'
Middle school
Combined school
2009-2010
Beta
-1.01
-1.39
-2.05
P
.07*
.00**
.00**
Exp(B)
.37
.25
.13
2007-2008
Beta
-1.28
-.76
.28
P
.04**
.21
.58
Exp(B)
.28
.47
1.32
-.66
-.75
-1.09
.07*
.08*
.28
.52
.47
.34
-.40
-.30
.65
-.72
-.75
.05**
.06**
.48
.47
-.68
.60
.34
.52
.47
.14
.21
.67
.74
1.92
.51
1.82
[Table continued on next page]
284. Principals responded "yes" or "no" to this question. See 2009-2010 SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 7; 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra
note 25, at 7.1 dummy-coded this variable, making the reference category "no."
285. Principals responded "yes" or "no" to this question. See 2009-2010 SSOCS
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at 8; 2007-2008 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra
note 25, at 8.1 dummy coded this variable, making the reference category "no."
286. b is the coefficient for the independent variables. "The coefficient for the
[independent] variable estimates the change in the dependent variable for any
one-unit increase in the independent variable." Wright, supra note 274, at 22. p is
the probability that 6 coefficient is zero. See id. at 227. Exp(B) is the odds ratio,
which represents the change in the odds of principals conducting random sweeps
for a one-unit increase in the predictor. Id. at 223. With respect to categorical
variables, it represents the change in the odds of principals conducting random
sweeps when that condition is present. Id. at 233.
287. Schools with a minority population of 50 percent or higher is the variable
against which each of the subcategories is compared.
288. "Schools having less than three hundred students" is the variable against
which each of the subcategories is compared.
289. High school is the variable against which each of the subcategories is
compared.
2013] RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES 421
Urbanicity""
Urban
Suburban
Town
Percent eligible
for free and
reduced lunch"'
Between 0-20%
Between 21-50%
[Table continued
on next page]
Region of
country"^
Western state
Northeastern
state
Midwestern state
High, moderate,
or mixed crime
rates where
students reside
High or moderate
crime rates where
school is located
Juvenile justice
agency involved
Law enforcement
officer on campus
-1.40
-1.36
-.23
.02**
.03**
.58
.25
.26
.80
-2.00
-1.18
-.44
.00**
.05**
.35
.13
.31
.64
-.54
-.07
.32
.84
.58
.93
-1.17
-.09
.07*
.82
.31
.91
[Table continued on next page]
-1.24
-1.32
-.46
-.02
-.30
.44
.22
.02**
.02**
.20
.97
.60
.14
.50
.29
.27
.63
.98
.74
1.56
1.25
-1.50
.57
.03
.82
.81
.91
.74
.01**
.30
.94
.07*
.17
.01**
.05**
.22
1.78
1.03
2.27
2.25
2.48
2.10
**p < .05; * p < .10 (approaching significance)
A few key predictors emerged from the analysis. First, the
data show that the odds of conducting random sweeps without
reporting any incidents relating to substance abuse or weapons
were greater for schools with higher minority populations than
for schools with lower minority populations. Specifically, the
odds for schools with minority populations of over 50 percent
were more than 2.7 times greater in 2009-2010, and more than
3.6 times greater in 2007-2008, than for schools with minority
populations of between 0 and 5 percent.2^3 This holds true even
when taking into account other factors that may influence
290. Rural schools are the variable against which each of the subcategories is
compared.
291. Schools having more than 50 percent of its students eligible for free or
reduced lunch is the variable against which each of the subcategories is compared.
292. Southern states are the variahle against which each of the subcategories
is compared.
293. See infra Table 2. Because the coefficients are negative, the probabilities
are found by dividing one by the odds ratio (Exp(B)). See MICHAEL H. KATZ,
MULTrVARIABLE ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 130 (1999)
(explaining procedure for computing the odds ratio for a negative coefficient).
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school officials to conduct these searches, such as their
perceptions of the crime levels where students reside and
where the school is located, the percent of students eligible for
free and reduced lunch, school level, school enrollment size,
and school location. ^ 94 in 2009-2010, the odds of conducting
these searches were four times greater for schools with
minority populations of over 50 percent than for schools with
minority populations between 5 and 20 percent. ^ 95 Also in
2009-2010, the odds were 7.7 times greater for schools with
minority populations of over 50 percent than for schools with
minority populations between 20 and 50 percent. ^ ^^  More
research is needed to discover the reasons behind the different
results across school years and why, in 2009-2010, the greatest
odds emerged from comparing schools with minority
populations of 20 and 50 percent to schools with over 50
percent. Nevertheless, the general finding that emerged from
this analysis is clear: the odds of conducting random sweeps
without reporting any incidents relating to substance abuse or
weapons were greater for schools with higher percentages of
minority students than for schools with lower percentages of
minority students.
Second, in both 2009-2010 and 2007-2008, the odds for
conducting these searches without reporting any incidents
relating to substance abuse or weapons were over three times
greater in rural schools than in urban schools or suburban
schools. 297 Third, the data indicate that these searches
primarily occurred in schools located in the south. 298 In both
2009-2010 and 2007-2008, the odds were over three times
greater in schools located in southern states than in schools
294. This is done by statistically controlling for the effects of these other
variables. See Philip B. Stark, Glossary of Statistical Terms, UNIV. OF CAL.
BERKELEY, DEP'T OF STAT., http://statistics.berkeley.edu/-stark/SticiGui/Text/
gloss.htm#c (last modified Mar. 19, 2012) ("To control for a variable is to try to
separate its effect from the treatment effect, so it will not confound with the
treatment. There are many methods that try to control for variables. Some are
based on matching individuals between treatment and control; others use
assumptions about the nature of the effects of the variables to try to model the
effect mathematically, for example, using regression.").
295. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
296. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
297. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
298. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
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located in western states.^99 Likewise, in 2009-2010, the odds
were over three times greater in schools located in southern
states than in schools located in northeastern states.^''^
Other variables were significant in either 2009-2010 or
2007-2008, but not across both school years. For example, in
2007-2008, the odds for conducting these searches were over
three times greater for schools having over 50 percent of their
students qualify, for free or reduced lunch than for schools
having between 0 and 20 percent qualify for free or reduced
lunch. 301 In 2007-2008, the odds were over two times greater
in schools that involved juvenile justice agencies in the school's
efforts to promote safe and drug-free schools than in schools
that did not involve those agencies.^02 Also in 2007-2008, the
odds were over two times greater in schools that had a security
guard, security personnel, or sworn law enforcement officer
present at their schools at least once a week than in schools
that did not.303 in 2009-2010, the odds were over two times
greater in high schools than in middle or combined schools.^ '^ '^
Also in 2009-2010, the odds were greater in schools with
smaller student populations than in schools with mid-size
student populations. ^ ^^  More research must be conducted to
determine why these factors were not significant in both school
years and whether they will be significant in the future.
IV. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND RECOIVIMENDATIONS
This section discusses the implications of the empirical
findings against the legal and normative analyses set forth in
Sections I and II. It then provides recommendations based on
the empirical findings. It concludes by providing a roadmap for
further research projects on these issues.
299. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
300. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
301. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
302. See supra Table 2.
303. See supra Table 2. Because the Beta weights are negative, the
probabilities are found by dividing 1 by Exp(B). See KATZ, supra note 293, at 130.
304. See supra Table 2.
305. See id.
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A. Discussion of Findings
An analysis of the SSOCS data raises concerns that some
school officials may be violating students' civil rights by
conducting suspicionless searches of students' personal
belongings without having particularized evidence of a
substance abuse or weapons problem. If constitutional
violations are indeed taking place, schools are undermining one
of the missions of educational institutions, which is to transmit
common values that enable students to exercise the
responsibilities of citizenship and benefit from participation in
a free economy.306 As Justice Brennan reasoned, "[s]chools
cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good
citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard
the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms."^0^ Moreover, if such violations are taking place, they
put schools at risk of costly, time-consuming lawsuits.
But even if these searches are permissible under the
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they appear to be
inconsistent with students' best interests. The empirical
analysis indicates that many schools in the sample, and
hundreds across the country, performed random sweeps for
contraband during the school year even though they did not
report a single incident relating to weapons, drugs, or alcohol
during the school year. 308 As explained above, ^ ^^  education and
sociology experts maintain that using strict security measures
sends a powerful, adversarial message to students that they
306. Levin, supra note 10, at 1649; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
373-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Schools are places where we inculcate the
values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-
governing citizenry."). As Betsy Levin observes, what the mission of schools
should be and which values they should transmit has been the subject of much
debate. See Levin, supra note 10, at 1649 ("The mission of schools as transmitters
of social, moral, and political values makes it inevitable that disputes will arise
over which values are to be inculcated and who is authorized to make these
decisions. There is no consensus, for example, on whether schools should
emphasize a common language, history, and culture promoting assimilationist
and national norms, or emphasize plurahsm and diversity."). For a thorough
discussion of two competing missions of schools, see Dupre, supra note 10, at 64-
69.
307. Doe V. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 1027 ("We do not know what class petitioner was attending when
the poHce and dogs burst in [and sniffed her], but the lesson the school authorities
taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her
teacher had hoped to convey.").
308. See supra Section III.D., Figure 2.
309. See supra Section II.
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are suspect and are not to be trusted. ^ '^^  It sours students'
attitudes, alienates students, creates discord and disunity,
invades students' privacy that is necessary for a healthy self-
esteem, and undermines a positive, healthy learning
environment that can be very difficult to achieve in schools.^'^
In addition, there may be a real danger that some schools are
socializing students to tolerate and expect this type of
treatment by government officials.^^^
The analysis also demonstrates that the odds for
conducting these potentially unconstitutional searches are
greater in schools with higher minority populations than in
schools with lower minority populations, even after taking into
account school officials' perceptions of the level of crime where
students live and where the school is located.^'3 This finding is
consistent with other empirical studies that show that minority
students more often are subject to strict security measures
resembling prison-like conditions than white students.31'* The
concerns associated with this finding are threefold.
First, this finding supports the theory that the primary
mission of minority schools is not to educate, but to ensure
custody and control.31^ This is demonstrated by the fact that
schools with higher minority populations appear to be more
willing to perform random sweeps than schools serving
primarily white students, even in an educational environment
that appears to be less hampered by school crime.3'6 Second, as
explained above,3i'7 such criminal-justice oriented practices
perpetuate racial inequalities by conditioning minority
students to expect intense surveillance by government
authorities and limiting their future opportunities if they are
arrested.318 Third, applying strict security measures
disproportionately to racial minorities teaches harmful lessons
to both minorities and white students, sending the socially
disturbing message to all students that white students are
310. See Gardner, siipra note 10, at 943.
311. See Hirschfield, supra note 161, at 46; see also Weiss, supra note 165, at
213,227.
312. See KUPCHIK & WARD, supra note 29, at 3-10.
313. See sitpra Section III.E.
314. See Nance, supra note 202, at 27-33; see also KUPCHIK & WAED, supra
note 29, at 20-26.
315. See Wacquant, supra note 207, at 189-90.
316. See siipra Section III.E.
317. See supra Section II.B.
318. See KUPCHIK & WARD, supra note 29, at 6-7.
426 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
privileged, that white students have greater rights to privacy,
and that minorities are suspect and cannot be trusted. Not only
do such messages alienate minority students from schools,
promote disengagement from the community, and generate
apathy towards the government and society,^'^ but they also
cause minorities to be skeptical about white society's desire for
racial equality.^20 gi^ cj^ ^ skepticism feeds a cycle of racial
tensions and anger that leads to an undesirable world for
people of all races to live in.^^i ^g Sharon Rush explained,
"[o]ur children are watching us. They learn about race and race
relations from us. As adults, we must be careful not to promote
a vision of social reality that teaches non-white children that
they are racially inferior or that teaches white children that
they are racially superior."^22
Further, the analysis indicates that schools that perform
these searches without reporting any incidents relating to
drugs or weapons tend to be small, rural schools located in the
south.323 'pj^ is finding, at first glance, may appear surprising to
some because many observe that strict security practices
typically take place in inner-city schools. ^ 4^ Indeed, another
empirical study I conducted indicates that large, urban schools
are more likely to implement intense security measures that
simulate prison-like conditions than other schools. ^ 5^ However,
the focus in this Article is schools that reported no incidents
relating to drugs, alcohol, or weapons during the school year,
which is an uncommon occurrence for large, inner-city schools.
But despite the different focuses, it is worth emphasizing that
the results from both studies point to the same unfortunate
fact: minorities more often are subject to strict security
319. Id. at 4 (explaining that students subject to strict security measures may
become adults "who do not participate in mainstream political processes and are
apathetic towards government policies and institutions, having experienced civic
alienation or exclusion as part of their early educational experience")-
320. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't
Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1999) (describing how minorities are
skeptical about the white society's commitment to racial equality based on the
realities of the world they view).
321. See, e.g., id. at 31-39.
322. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and
Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 33, 42 (1997).
323. See supra Section III.E.
324. See Wacquant, supra note 207, at 82. (arguing that poor inner-city schools
have a carcéral atmosphere to ensure custody and control); see also Hirschfield,
supra note 161, at 40 (positing that intensive surveillance of urban minority
students conditions students to be prisoners, soldiers, or service sector workers).
325. See Nance, supra note 202, at 27-33.
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measures than white students in many types of environments.
The larger question, however, remains unanswered, which
is why small, rural schools located in the South more often
perform these intrusive measures without reporting any
incidents relating to weapons or substance abuse. It is possible
that school officials use security measures as a shortcut for
addressing the real problem schools face: how to deal with
troubled students who commit violent acts, are disorderly, or
who promote substance abuse. Of course, these problems are
difficult to address and require the assistance of mental health
experts, counselors, behaviorists, and support from parents and
the community. But, unfortunately, such costly resources are
not always available to school officials, especially to those who
work in small, rural schools with small budgets. Nevertheless,
although the reasons small, southern, rural schools with high
minority populations rely more on strict security measures are
unclear, the results suggest that these schools may need
targeted training and more resources to provide better
educational experiences for students. And if additional training
and resources do not promote needed changes, students and
their parents from these areas may need help seeking legal
redress to protect their rights.
B. Recommendations
School security measures and their implications involve
complex, sensitive issues that should be addressed by state and
federal legislatures, courts, school boards, school
administrators, teachers, students, parents, business leaders,
and members of the community. Based on these preliminary
findings, this Article makes three primary recommendations to
these constituencies.
First, this Article recommends that courts take a more
assertive role in establishing a baseline standard for school
officials to follow when deciding whether to engage in intrusive
search practices. Although the current legal framework
indicates that school officials should not be permitted to search
students' belongings absent a serious substance abuse or
weapons problem, the Supreme Court and all of the federal
circuit courts, except the Eighth Circuit, have not yet directly
addressed this issue. Accordingly, this Article urges courts
around the country, and especially the Supreme Court, to
follow the Eighth Circuit's lead and expressly require school
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officials to provide concrete evidence of a serious substance
abuse or weapons problem before permitting schools to engage
in intrusive search practices and provide students with
appropriate relief when schools do not. Courts generally are
reluctant to interfere with school officials' day-to-day
administrative practices, ^ 6^ b^^ ^]^Qy must set appropriate
boundaries to protect students' Fourth Amendment rights,
particularly in a setting where students are learning the
contours of their civil rights and are forming views of
themselves, their communities, and their place in society. Too
often courts refuse to hold schools accountable for performing
intrusive searches without having sufficient justification for
doing so. ^ 27 T^YIÍQ recommendation applies equally to state
courts as well as federal courts. In fact, independent of how the
Supreme Court decides this issue, states can interpret
principles from their own constitutions to provide students
with greater privacy rights than what students currently enjoy
under the U.S. Constitution.^^s
Second, stronger court intervention cannot be the only
means to rectify these issues, especially if the number of suits
brought by parents of aggrieved students remains low.329 State
legislatures should consider requiring state and local boards of
education to employ an education ombudsman^^^ to act as an
326. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (holding that
students' Fourth Amendment rights are abridged because the Court cannot
disregard schools' custodial and tutelary responsibilities).
327. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009)
(concluding that the school violated the Fourth Amendment by strip searching a
student without sufficient justification, but denying relief because school official
acted in good faith and did not violate a "clearly established" right); B.C. ex rel.
Powers V. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying
relief for a suspicionless search because school official acted in good faith and did
not violate a "clearly estabhshed" right); see also Feld, supra note 10, at 947-52
(describing the limited remedies available to students for constitutional
violations).
328. See William J. Brennan Jr., Síaíe Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("[SJtate courts cannot rest
when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the Federal
Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law."); see also Bloom, supra note 121, at 356 (explaining
that some states have interpreted their own laws to require particularized
evidence of a drug problem before justifying random drug testing).
329. See Feld, supra note 10, at 950-52 (describing the impediments for
bringing a civil suit to protect Fourth Amendment privacy rights).
330. An ombudsman is "a government official . . . appointed to receive and
investigate complaints made by individuals against abuses or capricious acts of
public officials." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, Definition of Ombudsman,
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independent intermediary to resolve these and other
complaints that arise among families and school officials. Some
state and local school boards already have educational
ombudsmen in place to resolve problems between families and
schools, which could be used as a model for other schools.^^^ If
an ombudsman were readily available to students and parents
at no cost and would maintain confidences, the ombudsman
could ameliorate many problems students face to protect their
civil rights.
Third, school officials and policymakers should consider
alternative, more effective means for reducing school violence
and drug abuse than resorting to methods that rely on coercion,
punishment, and fear. As explained above, programs that
promote a strong sense of community and collective
responsibility more effectively reduce school crime and do not
degrade the learning environment. ^ 2^
C. A Roadmap for Further Research
These preliminary empirical findings provide sufficient
justification for conducting further research on these important
issues. One obvious place to begin is to reformulate the series
of questions posed in the SSOCS. The U.S. Department of
Education (DOE) might be well served to solicit the help of
attorneys who have expertise in education law or criminal
procedure to craft questions to reduce or eliminate ambiguity
in their surveys. For example, it would be helpful to include
questions that specifically target whether school officials
randomly search through students' belongings, their lockers,
their belongings stored in their lockers, their automobiles, or
perform pat-downs on students. The DOE might consider
asking other questions pertaining to these searches, such as
how often they conduct these searches, who conducts these
searches (i.e., principals, teachers, security guards, or law
enforcement officers), the conditions under which these
searches are conducted, and why they are conducted. Armed
with this additional information, the DOE would be better
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ombudsman Qast visited
Sept. 29, 2012).
331. See, e.g., WASH. ST. OFF. OFTHE EDUC. OMBUDSMAN, Welcome to the Office
of the Education Ombudsman, http://www.governor.wa.gov/oeo/ (last visited on
Sept. 29, 2012); PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, School Concerns'? Talk to our new
Ombudsman (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.pps.kl2.or.us/news/6711.htm.
332. See supra Section ILA.
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equipped to recommend appropriate training programs for
school officials that would improve the educational climate of
schools and help schools avoid costly litigation.
In addition to reformulating the SSOCS, other studies
might seek to identify the types of search practices school
officials believe they can conduct under various conditions.
Those studies could identify particular gaps in school
administrators' knowledge of constitutional law and provide
crucial information that school district officials and other
experts need to properly educate and train school
administrators. ^ ^^
Further, additional studies should seek to identify why
school officials implement strict security measures, particularly
in schools with high minority populations. Important questions
that remain unanswered include: (1) Are under-resourced
schools using these measures as a shortcut to provide an
orderly environment instead of helping students change their
behavior in more positive ways? (2) Are school officials
responding to political or community pressures? (3) Do school
officials believe that strict security measures are the most
effective measures to reduce school crime? And (4) do school
officials have implicit biases against minority students?
Finally, studies are needed to assess the long-term impact
on students, both minorities and whites, who are subject to
strict security measures. Such studies are difficult and costly,
but they are an integral part of the cost-benefit analysis that
school officials and other policymakers perform when deciding
whether to implement these measures.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a legal, empirical, and normative
analysis of random, suspicionless searches of students'
belongings. It argues that random, suspicionless searches of
students' belongings are not permitted under the Fourth
Amendment unless certain conditions are present in the school.
333. See Earl J. Ogletree & Nancy Lewis, School Law: A Survey of Educators,
35 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 274-79 (1986) (providing empirical evidence that
educators' understanding of students' Fourth Amendment rights is deficient);
Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Mario S. Torres Jr., The Demographics of Justice:
Student Searches, Student Rights, and Administrator Practices, 39 ED. ADMIN. Q.
259, 276 (2003) ("[A] number of studies relative to educators' knowledge of the law
show that administrators and teachers are deficient in their understanding of
school law in general.").
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It also argues that strict security measures are harmful to the
educational climate and to students; especially when applied
disproportionately to minorities. In addition, it provides
empirical data which raises concerns that: (1) some public
schools may be violating students' civil rights by conducting
suspicionless searches on students' belongings without valid
justifications; and (2) schools with higher minority populations
are moré likely to conduct those potentially unconstitutional
searches than schools with lower minority populations.
These analyses should cause courts to strongly consider
following the lead of the Eighth Circuit and require school
officials to provide evidence of a substance abuse or weapons
problem before permitting schools to engage in an intrusive
search. Nevertheless, the most effective reform will occur if
school officials themselves voluntarily agree to refrain from
using measures that coerce and punish students and, instead,
adopt measures that promote collective responsibility and
trust. Such actions are more consistent with students' best
interests, will preserve a healthy learning environment in
which all children can learn more effectively, and will help
create a better society to live in for people of all races.
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